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Abstract
This Article attempts to construct an intellectually coherent and predictable analysis of joint
ventures, an undertaking which faces more serious problems under EEC law than U.S. law. First,
EEC law makes it necessary to determine whether the Merger Regulation or Article 85 applies
to any given joint venture. Second, Article 85’s unfortunate bifurcation into paragraphs (1) and
(3) (notification or nullity) and the resultant division of what should be a single antitrust analysis
poses significant obstacles in the EEC treatment of joint ventures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The General Problem: Joint Ventures Have Structural and
BehavioralAspects
The antitrust analysis of joint ventures is one of the most
A version of this Article will be published in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
(Barry Hawk ed., 1992). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1992.
* * Resident Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Brussels; Director,
Fordham Corporate Law Institute.
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difficult issues in antitrust law. The term itself is loosely used
and covers a wide variety of business arrangements.' Legal
definitions are equally elusive. In most countries' legislation,
there is no statutory definition even where the term joint venture appears in the statute. 2 For example, the EEC block exemptions on patent and know-how licensing exclude certain
"joint ventures" between competing parents from coverage
without defining that term. U.S. courts have not precisely defined what constitutes a joint venture, although classification of
an arrangement as a joint venture can result in the application
of different legal standards. 3 Commentators also differ. Some
focus on the creation or facilitation of increased output.
Others emphasize efficiency enhancement more generally.
Still others, like the U.S. Department of Justice, focus on economic integration between the parties as the essential characteristic of a joint venture.4
But much of the analytical confusion about joint ventures
has a deeper cause. Full-function arrangements between firms
invariably have both behavioral and structural aspects and implications. 5 Arrangements between actual competitors can be
arranged along a spectrum:
Mergers- Joint Ventures-Cartels
1. These range from full-function joint ventures, in which two competitors place
their entire overlap businesses into a new corporate entity, to simple joint research
and development ("R & D") or joint purchasing. This Article focuses on more complete or full-function joint ventures. It does not discuss single-function arrangements like joint advertising, joint R & D,joint purchasing or joint selling. For further
discussion of these arrangements, see 2 BARRY HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter HAWK
TREATISE].

2. One important exception is the EEC Merger Regulation's definitions of concentrative and cooperative joint ventures. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, OJ. L
395/1 (1989), corrected version in O.J. L 257/13 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Regulation]; see infta part II.B (discussing Merger Regulation). Certain defined "joint ventures" are exempted from the Canadian pre-merger notification provisions. See Canadian Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C., ch. 19, § 112 (2d Supp. 1988) (Can.).
3. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
4. This last definition may be the most attractive under U.S. antitrust law as long
as it is recognized that cooperative arrangements between actual or potential competitors that fail to involve integration should not be condemned simply because they
are not classified as "joint ventures."
5. This can also be true of single-function arrangements, such as joint R & D
agreements in industries where R & D is highly significant.

1991-1992]

JOINT VENTURES IN EEC

305

A particular joint venture (or a class of joint ventures) may be
viewed more like a close-knit integrated combination (merger)
or more like a loose-knit combination between independent
firms (cartel). 6
The vast majority of the world's antitrust laws have different statutes and substantive rules dealing with mergers on the
one hand and cartels on the other hand.7 This difference in
treatment rests on the theory that mergers have to do with
structure and cartels have to do with behavior. Because joint
ventures frequently have both structural and behavioral aspects, the merger laws and the cartel laws are both applied to

joint ventures in many jurisdictions. For example, section 1 of
the Sherman Act,' the rough counterpart of Article 85 of the

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the
"EEC Treaty"), 9 and section 7 of the Clayton Act,' 0 the
6. This suggests the importance of economic integration as perhaps the essential characteristic of a joint venture, at least where the legal issue is whether an arrangement should be viewed under stricter anti-cartel rules. A joint venture shifts
towards the mergers end of the spectrum to the extent that the parties integrate their
operations. Conversely, the less the economic integration, the more the parties remain independent operators.
7. Single-function joint ventures, notably R & D joint ventures, are frequently
subject to separately legislated rules. See, e.g., National Cooperative Research Act of
1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988); Commission Regulation No. 418/85, O.J. L
53/5 (1985) (block exemption for joint R & D). There are pending U.S. legislative
proposals concerning production joint ventures.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
9. Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11), 298 U.N.T.S.
3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Article 85 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
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Merger Regulation counterpart, can apply to the same joint
venture where the jurisdictional predicates are met." But
joint ventures do not fit neatly into one category or the other.
A risk to be avoided is overly rigid definitions that result in a
blindered application of different "structural" and "behav-

ioral" legal rules.
The issue in the United States, unlike in the EEC, has not
been whether a joint venture should be treated as a merger or
cartel; both statutes apply. Moreover, both statutes are applied by the same administrative and judicial bodies.' 2 The
theoretical risk of inconsistent results has generally been

avoided. Section 73 of the Clayton Act has rarely been applied
to joint ventures.'

3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
11. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
12. The joint venture classification issue can be important under U.S. antitrust
law in the determination of whether a per se prohibition rule or the rule of reason
should be applied. Generally speaking, the per se rule applies to "cartels" and the
rule of reason to all other agreements between competitors. Thus the joint venture
classification might defeat a claim that a joint selling arrangement among competitors constitutes a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988). Here the classification can be determinative because application of the U.S.
per se rule precludes the admissibility of evidence that the particular arrangement
was justified, i.e. asserted efficiencies or other competitive benefits/justifications are
rejected in principle once the court decides that the per se rule applies. However,
the existence or likelihood of efficiencies can be used in the first instance to decide
whether or not the rule of reason or per se rule applies to the general class of agreement at issue. This has prompted courts, commentators and the administrative agencies to flirt with a "quick look" or "truncated" rule of reason/per se analysis. See, e.g.,
PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAw (1978). See generally Barry
Hawk, The American (Anti-trust) Resolution: Lessons for the EEC?, 9 EuR. COMPETION L.
REV. 53 (1988).

Market power is also not required for a per se violation.

13. There are only a handful of joini venture cases under section 7. See, eg.,
Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. 158; Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174 (1979), aff'd sub nom.
Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub noma.Bruns-
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This is not the situation in the EEC where the definition of
a joint venture has far more practical importance. In the EEC
the joint venture classification issue is relevant to the determination of whether the Merger Regulation rules and fast track
procedures apply or whether the restrictive agreement/cartel
rules and leisurely procedures under Article 85 apply.
The proper analysis must focus on three possible anticompetitive risks:
(1) loss of actual or potential competition between the
parents in the market in which the joint venture operates;
(2) cartel or anticompetitive conduct between the parents in non-joint venture markets in which the parents compete (spillover effect), and
(3) foreclosure of third parties.
Excluded are asserted anticompetitive effects or restrictions on competition between the parents on the one hand and
the joint venture on the other. Competition between the parents and the joint venture should not be expected or postulated.
B. Two Obstacles to a Coherent EEC Analysis ofJoint Ventures
An intellectually coherent and predictable analysis ofjoint
ventures faces more serious problems under EEC law than
under U.S. antitrust law, principally for two reasons. First,
EEC law makes it necessary to determine whether the Merger
Regulation or Article 85 applies to any given joint venture.
Somewhere, a line has to be drawn. In fact, the line has been
drawn in such a way that there is considerable confusion about
the kind of joint ventures that are to be examined exclusively
under the merger rules (so-called "concentrative" joint ventures) and those to be examined under Article 85 as cartel/
wick Corp. v. FTC, 456 U.S. 915. (1982). This has minimized the risk that an efficiency-enhancing joint venture would be approved as reasonable under section I of
the Sherman Act and condemned under section 7 of the Clayton Act because of potential competition losses. For further elaboration, see 2 HAWK TREATiSE, supra note
1, at 307-08. This risk has been considerably reduced, at least with respect to government enforcement. The U.S. Department ofJustice has effectively combined section 1 and section 7 into a single analysis. See Department offistice Antitrust Guidelinesfor
International Operations §§ 2.1, 2.2, 3.4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 5, 6, 41 (Extra ed. no. 24, Nov. 10, 1988) [hereinafter Department of Justice
Guidelines].
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restrictive agreements (so-called "cooperative" joint ventures).
This almost metaphysical conundrum is discussed in part II.A

below.
Second,

Article

85's

unfortunate

bifurcation

into

paragraphs (1) and (3) (notification or nullity) and the resultant division of what should be a single antitrust analysis poses4
significant obstacles in the EEC treatment of joint ventures.'
The structural context (e.g., actual or potential competitive
overlap of the parents, market shares, concentration data, entry conditions) is even more important in assessing the competitive harms and benefits of joint ventures than is true with
respect to most other horizontal and vertical agreements. This
thorny issue is studied in part III below.
II. JOINT VENTURES THAT ESCAPE ARTICLE 85
A. From the "PartialMerger" Imbroglio to the Metaphysical
"ConcentrativeJoint Venture"
For most of the EEC's existence Article 85 did not apply
to mergers and other "structural" arrangements.' 5 As there
was no specific merger statute until 1990, only the abuse of
dominant position provisions of Article 8616 were available to
challenge mergers.' 7 Certain joint ventures were deemed
"partial mergers" and thus escaped Article 85's cumbersome
notification or nullity regime.1 8 But partial mergers were
14. EEC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 85.
15. From 1966 until the early 1980s this was the Commission position. This
position was originally taken in a 1966 memorandum where the Commission overrode the initial opinions of outside experts. Karen Banks, Mergers and PartialMergers
Under EEC Law, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 373, 375-84 (Barry Hawk ed., 1988);
Christopher Bellamy, Mergers Outside the Scope of the New Merger Regulation-Implications
of the Philip Morris Judgment, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 22 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1989); see 2 HAWK TREATISE, supra note 1, at 950-51. This position was modified
somewhat in 1987 with the Court of Justice's judgment in the Philip Morris case,
where the Court declared that Article 85 does apply to minority shareholdings under
certain circumstances. British American Tobacco Co. and R.J. Reynolds Indus. v.
Commission, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, [1987] E.C.R. 4487, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 24
[hereinafter Philip Morris]; see Bellamy, supra; Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, Merger Control in the Common Market: Between Competition Policy and Industrial Policy, in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 20 (Barry Hawk ed., 1989).
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 86.
17. See, e.g., Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission,

Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199; see also 2 HAWK TREATISE, supra
note 1, at 954.
18. See generally Banks, supra note 15.
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found only "in exceptional cases" and most joint ventures
were found to be cooperative and subject to Article 85. The
Commission strictly required for a "partial merger" that (1)
the parents completely and irreversibly abandoned the joint
venture's market, and (2) competition was not weakened in
other markets, particularly related markets, where the parents
remained formally independent of each other.
The advent of the Merger Regulation has ushered in a new
doctrinal mechanism to exclude "structural" joint ventures
from the application of Article 85. The "partial merger" imbroglio has been transmogrified into the metaphysical concentrative-cooperative distinction. This distinction is intended to
separate "concentrative" joint ventures that fall under the
Merger Regulation from "cooperative" joint ventures that remain subject to the very different substantive rules and procedures under Article 85.
B. Joint Ventures Under the Merger Regulation
One perceived concern facing the drafters of the Regulation was to ensure that mergers and partial mergers (or concentrative joint ventures) do not fall outside the Merger Regulation simply because they involve some "cooperative" or collusive (cartel) aspects or risks. On the other hand, there was
concern that an overly broad definition of a concentrative joint
venture would result in too many arrangements between competitors escaping the stricter rules of Article 85 because the
same concept of "concentration" applies above and below the
Merger Regulation's size thresholds. Thus all "concentrations" below those thresholds have been put outside the scope
of the Commission's enforcement powers under Regulation
No. 17.19 This is similar to the policy concern which also underlay the Commission's narrow definition of a "partial
merger."
The Merger Regulation distinguishes between "concentrative" and "cooperative" joint ventures. Concentrative joint
ventures refer to transactions that lead to a lasting structural
change in the participating firms. They are governed only by
19. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13 J.O. 204 (1962), 0.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 87.
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the Merger Regulation and thus escape Article 85.20 Cooperative joint ventures are those that represent a temporary coordination of competitive activities between two otherwise independent firms. Cooperative joint ventures do not fall under
the Merger Regulation and are analyzed under Articles 85 and
86. It is thus extremely important to be able to distinguish between concentrative ,and cooperative joint ventures. Different
statutes-and more importantly, different substantive rules,
administrative procedures and deadlines-pertain depending
on whether a joint venture is classified as concentrative or cooperative.
1. The Merger Regulation's Definition
The Merger Regulation defines a concentrative joint venture as one that "perform[s] on a lasting basis all the functions
of an autonomous economic entity [and] which does not give
rise to coordination of the competitive behaviour of the parties
21
amongst themselves or between them and the joint venture."
Thus, in the broadest terms, the essential characteristics are:
(1) a permanent structural change (lasting entity); (2) a fullyfunctioning entity, and (3) a lack of possible coordination of
competitive behavior.
2. The Guidelines' Approach to Concentrative/Cooperative
Joint Ventures
The merger guidelines amplify the definition of a concentrative joint venture.2 2 A joint venture is an undertaking: it
must be "an organized assembly of human and material resources, intended to pursue a defined economic purpose on a
23
long-term basis."
The joint venture for the purposes of the Merger Regula20. Merger Regulation, supra note 2, OJ. L 257/13 (1990). This is undoubtedly
true with respect to concentrative joint ventures large enough to meet the Merger
Regulation's presently very high thresholds. Smaller concentrative joint ventures
also probably escape Article 85, although there remains some small doctrinal uncertainty on the point.
21. Id. art. 3(2), O.J. L 257/13, at 17, 2.
22. See Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations under
Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 395/1 (1989), on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, O.J. C 203/10 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
23. Id. at 11, 8.
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tion must be jointly controlled by other undertakings. 24 Control means the possibility of exercising, directly or indirectly, a
decisive influence on the activities of the joint venture.25 Joint
control exists where the parents must agree on decisions concerning the joint venture's activities either because of the
rights acquired in the joint venture or because of contracts or
other means establishing joint control. 26 Despite a majority interest by one parent, there can still be joint control based on
agreements or consultation between the parents.27
Single control is generally the case where one parent owns
more than half the capital or assets of the joint venture, has the
right to appoint more than half of the managing or supervisory
bodies, controls more than half of the votes or has the sole
right to manage the joint venture's business. Significantly, if
one parent's holding is insufficient to establish sole control
and if there is no joint control with other parties, then there is
no concentration within the meaning of the Regulation. The
joint venture is deemed cooperative and falls within Article
85.28

Once a jointly controlled undertaking has been found, it
will only be a concentration governed by the Regulation where
the conditions set forth in article 3(2) of the Regulation are
met. The guidelines characterize these as a positive and negative condition.29
To satisfy the positive condition, the joint venture must
perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity. Specifically, the joint venture must act as an
independent supplier and buyer on the market. Joint ventures
that serve merely as auxiliaries to the commercial activities of
their parents are not considered concentrations. Thus, where
the joint venture supplies its products exclusively to the parents or meets its needs wholly from them, or even where it
deals mostly with third parties but remains substantially dependent on the parents for maintenance and development of
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

9.
11.
13.
14.
15.
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the joint venture's business, no concentration will be found. 0
A concentrative joint venture must also be able to carry on
its activity for an unlimited or long period of time. This is
measured by time and more importantly by the human and material resources contributed to the joint venture. Where the
parents contribute substantial financial resources to the joint
venture, transfer an existing business or give the joint venture
substantial technical or commercial know-how, this evidences
the parents' intent to ensure the joint venture's existence and
independence in the long term.31
Finally, the joint venture must exercise its own commercial policy, with the parents restricted to the role of financially
interested major shareholders who intervene in the joint venture's management only to protect their substantial investment. That the parents oversee the joint venture's general
commercial policy or reserve to themselves the right to make
decisions important for the development of the joint venture
(mainly those concerning changes in the company's objectives,
capital increases or reductions or application of profits) does
not deprive the joint venture of its commercial independence.
The guidelines note, however, that common membership of
the joint venture and the parents' decision making bodies is at
least an obstacle to commercial independence where the joint
venture operates in the same market as its parents or in related
markets.32
The negative condition requires that "coordination" of
competitive behavior either between the parents or between
the parents and the joint venture not be the object or the effect
of the joint venture's formation or activities. 33 There will normally be no foreseeable coordination when all the parent companies withdraw entirely and permanently from the joint venture's market and do not operate on markets neighboring
those of the joint venture's. Even where the joint venture and
30. Id. at 11-12, 16.
31. Id.at 12,
17.
32. Id.
18-19.
33. The Merger Regulation does not define "coordination" or "risk of coordination." The terms are most appropriately understood in light of Article 85 of the EEC
Treaty, which requires an appreciable restriction of competition. See EEC Treaty,
supra note 9, art. 85. This suggests that the "risk of coordination" necessary to exclude the Merger Regulation means risk of an appreciable restriction of competition
under Article 85(1).
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parents operate in adjacent markets, the risk of coordination
will be relatively small where the parents limit the influence
they exercise to the joint venture's strategic decisions, such as
those concerning the future direction of investment, and when
they express financial, rather than market oriented, interests.3 4
The guidelines recognize that joint control is inconceivable without an understanding between the parents regarding
their interest in the joint venture, and thus not every form of
cooperation between the parents places the joint venture
outside the Regulation. The decisive factor is existence of potential competition between the parents and the joint venture,
i.e., whether there are direct or indirect, actual or potential,
effects of the formation and operation of the joint venture on
market relationships ."
34. Merger Guidelines, supra note 22, 0.J. C 203/10, at 12, $ 20 (1990).
35. Id. 21. The guidelines set forth four examples to illustrate the dividing
line between those cases where there will be a likelihood of coordination and those
where there will not.
Case 1 is ajoint venture that takes over pre-existing activities of the parents. d.
at 13, $ 24(a). This type ofjoint venture is concentrative where the parent companies
withdraw permanently from the joint venture's market. A concentrative joint venture
is also possible where the parents withdraw from the joint venture's market (i.e. Europe) but remain permanently active in another widely separated geographic market
(i.e. East Asia). The guidelines suggest, however, that ajoint venture would probably
be considered cooperative where the markets of the parent and the joint venture are
in different parts of the Community or in neighboring third countries. Id.
25, 2930.
The parents' withdrawal from the joint venture's market may occur over a short
transitional period intended to overcome start-up problems for the joint venture,
such as bottlenecks in production or supply. This period should not normally exceed
one year. Withdrawal from the joint venture's market is not sufficient, however, to
make ajoint venture concentrative. The guidelines state further that neither parent
may remain an actual or potential competitor of the other or of the joint venture, and
that there must be no spillover effect in other markets. Id.
28-29.
Case 2 concerns a joint venture that undertakes new activity on behalf of the
parents. Id. I 24(b). This is normally concentrative where the parents, individually
have not entered the joint venture's product market and will not enter in the foreseeable future because they lack the organization, or the technical or financial means.
This is true, however, only if the joint venture's market is neither upstream, nor
downstream nor neighboring to that of the parents. Id. at 13-14, $ 31.
Under Case 3, a joint venture which involves entry into a geographic and product market is presumptively cooperative where the parents (or one of them) remain
active in the joint venture's market or remain potential competitors of the joint venture. Id.
24(c), 33.
Case 4 considers, among other transactions, joint ventures operating in markets
upstream, downstream or neighboring to that of the parents. Id. at 13, 24(d). In
general, if the parents compete in upstream or downstream markets there is a risk of
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3. Separable and Ancillary Restrictions
As mentioned above, the drafters of the Regulation were
concerned to ensure that joint ventures do not fall outside the
Merger Regulation simply because they have some "cooperative" aspects. There was also concern that a transaction generally approved under the Regulation should not be undone
through the imposition of Article 85 nullity on restrictive
clauses in the relevant agreements.
The Commission has attempted to meet these concerns
and to introduce flexibility through the separability provision.
The guidelines provide that transactions which include both a
structural change and the coordination of competitive behavior fall outside the Regulation where the two are not "separable." If the structural change can be separated from the "coordination" of competitive behavior, the former will be assessed
under the Regulation and the latter, to the extent that it does
not amount to an ancillary restriction, will be examined under
Articles 85 and 86.36
4. Commission Decisions
In the first ten months since the Regulation has been in
effect, twenty-five joint ventures have been notified. The Commission found twenty-one to be concentrative, three to be cooperative and one, Renault/Volvo, 7 concentrative in part and
cooperative in part. The first year of Merger Regulation decisions permits several preliminary conclusions about the Commission's valiant attempt to distinguish joint ventures that are
subject to the Regulation from those that are subject to Article
85.
Early fears when the guidelines were issued that the Commission would take a strict view of what constitutes a concentrative joint venture in order not to be flooded with notifications have proven unfounded. The Commission appears quite
coordination. If they are not competitive, normally there is such a risk only where
the joint venture's sales or purchases are made in substantial measure with the parents. Id. at 14, 35.
36. See Donald Holley, Ancillary Restrictions in Mergers and Joint Ventures, in 1990
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 423 (Barry Hawk ed., 1991).

37. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Nov. 7, 1990), cited in O.J. C 281/2 (1990), [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 906.
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willing to find concentrative joint ventures in doubtful cases. 8
The decisions have refined considerably the notion of
"joint control." The guidelines recognize that even if one parent has a majority share, joint control can still exist if there are
provisions for joint decision making. The decisions repeatedly
show that the Commission is willing to find that joint control
exists, regardless of the percentage interest, where the parents
share the critical strategic decisions.
For example, in Conagra/IDEA39 the Commission found
that Conagra and IDEA's parent company would jointly control IDEA, even though Conagra acquired only 20 percent of
IDEA's capital shares and 26 percent of the voting rights. The
acquisition agreement provided that Conagra's assent would
be required on issues such as the approval of the annual
budget and strategic plans, significant deviations from the
budget or plans, approval of all major investments, the launching of new products, and the hiring and remuneration of senior executives.4 ° Other cases have reached similar results
where two parties forming a new entity were required to have
equal input and assent on major decisions despite the uneven
ownership interests. 4 '
38. See, e.g., BNP/Dresdner Bank-Czechoslovakia, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Aug.
26, 1991), cited in OJ. C 226/28 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 818.
39. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'n May 30, 1991), cited in OJ. C 175/18 (1991), [199114
C.M.L.R. 580.
40. See Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n June 18, 1991) (34 percent/34
percent and veto rights over major decisions), cited in 0.J. C 172/8 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 580; see also P6chiney/Usinor-Sacilor, slip op. (Eur. Comm'nJune 24, 1991)
(66 percent/34 percent participation), cited in 0J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 580.
41. E.g., Arospatiale/MBB, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991) (60 percent/
40 percent participation), cited in 0J.C 59/13 (1991); see Varta/Bosch, 0.J. L 320/26
(1991); Commission Press Release IP (91) 766 (July 31, 1991) (65 percent/35 percent participation in Varta/Bosch); see also Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. (Eur.
Comm'nJune 10, 1991) (where parties formed several joint ventures, unequal representation on joint ventures' boards was outweighed by requirement that two representatives of each party vote on certain topics), cited in 0J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 739.
See also KELT/American Express, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Aug. 20, 1991), cited in
O.J. C 223/38 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 740, where the Commission found that a
consortium of eight banks which formed an entity to acquire an oil and gas firm was a
concentrative joint venture, and noted that even though one bank was the lead, unanimity was required among the eight for central strategic decisions.
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A different result was reached in Usinor/ASD,4 2 where Usinor's majority acquisition of ASD did not constitute joint control simply because certain board decisions were required to
be unanimous. Those decisions related solely to the protection of the rights of the minority shareholders and not to the
management of the company. This last distinction is the one
which the Commission tries to draw in joint control cases.
Initial hopes based on the first decision, Renault/Volvo,
that the economic integration of the parents' operations would
be the most important factor in determining whether a joint
venture is concentrative, have not been borne out. Although
neither the Merger Regulation nor the guidelines expressly
mention economic integration, the combining of resources by
two firms is the fundamental economic rationale differentiating
mergers from cartels. Integration is the linchpin of the U.S.
Justice Department's distinction between merger/joint venture
analysis and per se cartel treatment. The extent of economic
integration certainly plays a less central role under the Merger
Regulation than it does in the Justice Department's joint venture analysis. Integration under the Merger Regulation serves
a secondary function of demonstrating that the parties have
permanently withdrawn from the joint venture's market or that
"autonomy" is ensured. Thus, integration has a more formalistic role than in the Justice Department's analysis, where integration rests on the presumption that economic efficiencies
arise from the integration of research and development ("R &
D"), production and distribution resources.
The Commission has focused on integration in several decisions. In Renault/Volvo integration was an important factor in
determining that the trucks and buses joint venture was concentrative while the automobile joint venture was cooperative.
In addition to 45 percent cross-shareholdings, the concentrative aspect of the truck/bus joint venture was confirmed by the
legally binding agreement to integrate the parties' activities,
including development, production, purchasing and product
and marketing strategies. This was said to lead to an "irreversible reciprocal dependency" between the two firms ensuring
the permanence of the joint venture since it would involve an
42. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Apr. 29, 1991), cited in O.J. C 193/34 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 663.

1991-1992]

JOINT VENTURES IN EEC

317

expensive competitive setback for either firm to withdraw from
the joint venture and enter the market independently. Failure
to integrate fully at the marketing level did not change the result. The parties planned to maintain separate trade names
and distribution networks. The Commission recognized that,
apart from the fact that this was necessary to maintain the parties' existing positions on the market, all strategic decisions relating to marketing and distribution would be made jointly.
The automobile joint venture, on the other hand, was not
concentrative. It involved only 25 percent cross-shareholdings
and, more importantly, the parties were not obligated to integrate all product ranges of their respective businesses. In case
of conflicting interests, each party could easily leave the venture and act independently.4 3
The guidelines' emphasis on "autonomy" is not reflected
in the decisions. It is mentioned in only two decisions.4 4 The
requirement that the joint venture perform on a lasting basis
all the functions of an autonomous economic entity is readily
satisfied where the parents contribute their entire businesses
to a joint venture.45
The Commission has also been willing to find that a joint
venture is fully functioning where the joint venture is not entirely self-sufficient or autonomous. In Varta/Bosch,4 6 for ex43. In Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991), cited in 0.J.
C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739, the parties established a worldwide "alliance" consisting of several joint ventures. In finding the ventures concentrative, the
Commission noted that the parties in each venture would combine their existing
manufacturing, administration, marketing, sales, distribution and support operations
and that the management structures of the joint ventures would be fully integrated.
44. See Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. (Eur. Comm'nJan 4., 1991), cited in O.J. C 5/7
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245; Varta/Bosch, "Europe" No. 5547, at 9 (Aug. 2,
1991).
45. See A6rospatiale/MBB, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 25, 1991) (parents transferred whole of their helicopter activities to new company), cited in O.J. C 59/13
(1991). In many cases, the Commission merely states in a conclusory fashion that the
joint venture is fully functioning. See, e.g., Driger/IBM/HMP, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n
June 28, 1991), citedin 0.J. C 236/6 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 817; P6chiney/UsinorSacilor, slip op. (Eur. Comm'nJune 24, 1991), cited in OJ. C 175/18 (1991), [1991) 4
C.M.L.R. 580; Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n June 18, 1991), cited in OJ. C
172/8 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; Conagra/IDEA, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n May
30, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 580; ASKO/Omni, slip
op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 21, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 51/12 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
330; Mitsubishi/UCAR, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Jan. 4, 1991), cited in 0.J. C 5/7
(1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245.
46. 0J. L 320/26 (1991).
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ample, the Commission found that the joint venture was fullyfunctioning in that it was responsible for development, production and sales. The fact that one of the parents would continue to distribute the product for the joint venture did not
detract from the stand-alone aspects of the joint venture because the parent would do so only as an agent of thejoint-venture.4 7
The Commission's benign neglect of "autonomy" is
praiseworthy given the theoretical and operational weaknesses
of "autonomy" as a factor in determining whether a joint venture should be treated as a merger or cartel. The theoretical
difficulty with the autonomy factor is that it bears little to no
relation to the substantive antitrust concerns. For example, assume that parents who remain actual or potential competitors
in the joint venture's market form a highly autonomous venture. The mere fact of the autonomy does not tend to alleviate
competitive concerns. The parents, in their own interests determined unilaterally, may rationally decide not to compete at
all or as vigorously in the joint venture's market. Conversely,
if the joint venture is not autonomous but the parents have
withdrawn from the joint venture's market and therefore are
no longer actual or potential competitors, the lack of autonomy should not detract from the otherwise concentrative elements. Autonomy of the joint venture is relevant to the spillover risk. However, it would be better to focus the inquiry directly on the risk, which cannot be assessed only by asking
questions about the joint venture's autonomy.
47. Similarly, in Sanofi/Sterling Drug, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n June 10, 1991),
cited in OJ. C 156/10 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 739, the parties transferred or licensed on a permanent basis their existing production, distribution and marketing
capabilities. The Commission found that the fact that the R & D functions, which are
extremely important to an ethical drug business, would remain with the parents and
not be contributed to the joint venture, did not mean that the joint venture was not
fully functioning. This was because the joint venture agreement established a mechanism through which the parents would decide jointly whether a new product should
be developed. If the parents decided against joint development, the parties could
not continue development individually. They could only assign or license their rights
to third parties.
Compare Baxter/Nestl6/Salvia, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 6, 1991), cited in 0J.
C 37/11 (1991), [19911 4 C.M.L.R. 245, where the Commission determined that
there was no concentration, noting among other things that there was "considerably
reduce[d] autonomous status" because the joint venture was dependent on knowhow licensed from the parents, which licenses could be easily withdrawn.
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Merger Task Force members have intimated publicly and
privately that the decisions provide a more reliable source of
the Commission's enforcement policy than the guidelines. It is
not clear whether Commission dissatisfaction with the guidelines rests on theoretical doubts or practical/administrative
difficulties in applying them. In any event, biblical exegesis of
the guidelines is not helpful in predicting the Commission's
reaction to a notified transaction.
Many Commission decisions can better be understood
under the old "partial merger" theory, which is perhaps being
resurrected faute de mieux. Certainly many Commission decisions seem to focus the inquiry on the same two factors: (1)
whether one (or both) parents have permanently withdrawn
from the joint venture's market, and (2) whether there are any
spillover anticompetitive effects outside the joint venture's
market. These factors are certainly appropriate because they
concern two of the three competitive risks: loss of actual or
potential competition in the joint venture's market, and "spillover" collusion/cartel effects in other markets.4
Non-compete clauses by the parents in favor of the joint
venture are considered evidence of withdrawal. 49 Even in
some of the less straightforward cases, the Commission has
been willing to countenance some product overlap or remote
potential competition, provided there is no realistic possibility
of competition between the parents and the joint venture in
the joint venture's market. In Mitsubishi/UCAR,5 ° for example,
Mitsubishi agreed to withdraw from the market for carbon and
graphite products in Europe where the joint venture would operate, but maintained a certain position in the market in Japan.
The Commission found that because (1) Mitsubishi was merely
a trader in the product (as opposed to a producer), (2) its posi48. The foreclosure concern is not always present. When it is, the Commission

also examines it in addition to the two factors in the text.
49. See, e.g., Conagra/IDEA, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n May 30, 1991) (no risk of
coordination where Conagra had no activities in relevant market and agreed not to
enter market other than through joint venture), cited in O.J. C 175/18 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 580; ASKO/Omni, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 21, 1991) (parents and
joint venture did not compete, and non-competition agreement confirmed parents'
intentions to abstain from joint venture's market), cited in OJ. C 51/12 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 330.
50. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Jan 4, 1991), cited in OJ. C 5/7 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 245.
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tion in Europe was negligible (.01 percent), and (3) UCAR, of
which Mitsubishi would now own 50 percent, was the largest
market participant in the EEC and worldwide, Mitsubishi was
not likely to be interested in reentering the market. Mitsubishi's non-compete agreement reflected this reality and was
viewed by the Commission as a "lasting withdrawal from the
EC markets." 5'.
Similarly, 'inSanofi/Sterling Drug52 the parties established
several joint ventures, two of which concerned ethical drugs
and the third over-the-counter ("OTC") drugs. In finding the
joint ventures concentrative, the Commission noted that the
"alliance" established by the parents left no room for coordination of competitive conduct. With regard to the ethical businesses, the parents had placed all their interests in the joint
venture. With respect to the OTC business, although Sterling
maintained independent operations in the United States, the
Commission found that there was no "realistic possibility" that
Sterling would reenter Europe because it had transferred all of
its assets and essential rights (e.g., trademark and product registrations in Europe) to the OTC venture.53
Another case demonstrating the Commission's willingness
to adjudge joint ventures concentrative because parents have
withdrawn from the joint venture's market and probably will
not (although they could) reenter that market is Drt'ger/IBM/
HMP.5 4 Three firms established ajoint venture to develop and
market computerized intensive health care and patient data
management systems. The Commission found that IBM, as
51. Id.

8.

52. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'nJune 10, 1991), citedin O.J. C 156/10 (1991), [1991]
4 C.M.L.R. 739.
53. The decision in Elf/BC/Cepsa, slip op. (Eur. Comm'nJune 18, 1991), cited in
OJ. C 172/8 (1991), [199114 C.M.L.R. 580, reflects a similar analysis. BC, a banking
firm, and Elf, a firm involved in the exploration of hydrocarbons, entered into an
agreement enabling them to control jointly Cepsa, a firm involved in the exploration,
production and development of petroleum products. The Commission found that
there was no coordination of competitive behavior between the parents or between
them and the joint venture because (1) the bank was not likely to enter the joint
venture's market, (2) neither Elf nor Cepsa was likely to enter the other's market
(petroleum versus hydrocarbons) because the structures of the markets were very
different, (3) Elf and Cepsa had only limited activities in each other's geographic
markets, and (4) Elf granted the joint venture a license to its trademark.
54. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'nJune 28, 1991), cited in O.J. C 236/6 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 817.
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well as the other parents, were not "realistic potential competitors" because reentry would not be commercially reasonable.
Not only would there be substantial costs and risks, but the
parents' non-compete obligations would not permit entry for
eighteen months resulting in late (and therefore presumably
ineffective) reentry.55
When reentry by the parents is more likely, a concentrative joint venture will not be found. In Apollinaris/Schweppes56
there was no concentration because the parents only partially
withdrew from the joint venture's market for the sale of mineral water and soft drinks in certain European countries. Because both parents remained in the same product market, the
joint venture would be "likely to lead to a division of markets." 57 The Commission further found that Schweppes would
remain a competitor of Apollinaris in Germany notwithstanding its agreement to transfer the whole of its beverage business
in Germany, including production facilities and machinery, to
the joint venture. Since the German market was growing and
Schweppes had the know-how to enter because of its continued business activities outside of Germany, reentry would be
commercially feasible. 8
As it does in its approach under Article 85(1), the Commission continues to speak of coordination or restrictions between the parents on one side and the joint venture on the
55. But see BNP/Dresdner Bank-Czechoslovakia, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Aug.
26, 1991) (finding that agreement by two EEC banks to control Hungarian banking
corporation to finance foreign trade transactions in Hungary was concentrative because two EEC parents were not active in special sector on Hungarian market; Commission did not address potential competition issue), cited in Oj. C 226/28 (1991),
[19911 4 C.M.L.R. 818.
56. Slip op. (Eur. Comm'n June 24, 1991), cited in O.J. C 203/14 (1991). The
joint venture was later approved under Article 85, after some modifications.
57. Id. 9.
58. To the same effect is Baxter/NestlW/Salvia, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 6,
1991), cited in OJ. C 37/11 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 245. A concentration was not
found because, among other things, both parents remained active in the market of
the joint venture through their participation in a prior cooperative joint venture. In
addition, both parents were active in closely related markets that the parents had
excluded from the joint venture's permissible field of activities. These factors created a likely risk of coordinated activity between the various ventures, including the
allocation of product and geographic markets.
Accord Elf/Enterprise, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n July 24, 1991) (finding no concentration where parents will continue their activities in same market in which joint venture will operate), cited in OJ. C 203/14 (1991).
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other. This is inappropriate. Continuing competition between
the parents and the joint venture in the joint venture's market
after the joint venture's formation should not be expected.
Formation of the joint venture itself may be considered as
eliminating competition between the parents and the joint venture in the joint venture's market. This loss of competition is
measured in the structural and essentially "merger" analysis of
the effects in the joint venture's market.
In non-joint venture markets the situation is more complicated. In those markets the principal antitrust concern is the
risk of collusion or anticompetitive conduct between the parents, i.e. the so-called spillover effect. Whether one should expect or encourage competition between the parents and the
joint venture in product or geographic markets not originally
given to the joint venture is problematic. The answer may depend on whether antitrust laws should be used to limit firms'
freedom to create joint ventures limited to specific product/
geographic markets when the parents have competing operations in other markets. In the EEC, the market integration policy goal suggests constraints on firms' freedom to restrict joint
ventures from competing against the parents in other Member
State territories not originally given to the joint venture.
The concentrative-cooperative distinction serves a mainly
jurisdictional function. It assigns a particular joint venture to
different substantive and procedural systems. 59 As a jurisdictional rule, the distinction is woefully inadequate. Jurisdictional rules must provide quick and predictable outcomes. In
this respect the concentrative-cooperative distinction remains
deeply flawed, despite the pragmatic efforts of the Commission
to make sense of it. As this author and others predicted, the
59. The concentrative-cooperative distinction not only allocates jurisdiction
within the EEC system between Articles 85 and 86 and the Merger Regulation. The
distinction can also effectively determine whether Member State antitrust and merger
control laws will apply to a particular transaction. Indeed, the mushrooming of
merger control in Europe suggests the necessity of a Europe-wide antitrust strategy
for acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures. The concentrative-cooperative distinction can play an important role in that strategy. Transactions can be structured to fall
within or escape certain jurisdictions. For example, joint ventures may be made
more "concentrative" in order to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EEC and
thus avoid Member State merger controls and national mini-Article 85s. For a fuller
discussion, see Barry Hawk, European Merger Control-NationalLaws and Enforcement
Policies (forthcoming).
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concentrative-cooperative distinction has increased legal uncertainty and transaction costs. 6° To speak frankly, a ridicu-

lous amount of Commission, counsel and business time is devoted to a jurisdictional issue that should be easily determinable.
Even if, like obscenity, one simply knows it when one sees
it,6 ' firms and their business and legal advisers can take little
comfort. Unfortunately, the first year of decisions has not seriously changed my characterization of the distinction made
before the Regulation became effective: (1) even experienced
antitrust lawyers will be unable to apply the distinction with
confidence; (2) economists will see it as another example of the
perversions lawyers make of economics, and (3) tax lawyers
and accountants who make their livings on formalisms will accept the distinction with no apparent discomfort.
The Commission continues its valiant but largely Sisyphean effort to make sense of the concentrative-cooperative
joint venture distinction. The distinction is theoretically
flawed. It exaggerates both the importance and the clarity of
the economic distinction between structure and behavior.
While it is true that industrial organization economics makes a
distinction between structure and behavior, it does not support
an either/or legal distinction that results in either the application of a structural merger control test or a behavioral cartel
test. The Merger Regulation decisions themselves indicate an
acute Commission sensitivity to the behavioral aspects of concentrations. This can be seen in the Commission's willingness
to condition clearances of mergers and concentrative joint ven62
tures on what are clearly behavioral remedies or conditions.
If war is too important to be left to the generals, then the
allocation ofjurisdiction overjoint ventures is too important to
be left to the theorists. Very important practical consequences
flow from the concentrative-cooperative distinction. To over60. Barry Hawk, Concentrative/CooperativeJoint Ventures: Metaphysics and the Law
(forthcoming).
61. Such was the jocular but sincere description of the German law distinction
by a highly experienced Bundeskartellamt official. Panel Discussion, Notification Requirements and Proceduresunder NationalMerger Laws Discussion, in 1990 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 269, 279 (Barry Hawk ed., 1991) (remarks of Kurt Markert); cf Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. See, e.g., Alcatel/Telettra, OJ. L 122/48 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 778; Fiat
Geotech/Ford New Holland, slip op. (Eur. Comm'n Feb. 8, 1991) (exclusive distributorship remedy decision), cited in O.J. C 118/14 (1991), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 330.
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simplify somewhat, as a joint venture leaves the high-tech,
deadline-driven world of the Merger Task Force, one moves to
the more leisurely, scarce-resources world of the operating divisions of DG IV. The solution is not to continue to engage in
the metaphysics of refining and re-refining the concentrativecooperative distinction. The best solution is to provide a unified analysis ofjoint ventures that includes both behavioral and
structural considerations. If this cannot be done under the existing legislation, which appears to be the case, then the second best solution is to eliminate administrative and procedural
differences to the extent possible between an examination of
an arrangement under the Merger Regulation and a joint venture under Article 85.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 85(1) TO COOPERATIVE
JOINT VENTURES
A. Introduction
The original sin in EEC competition law was the bifurcation of Article 85 with Regulation No. 17's conferral of exclusive competence on the Commission to grant exemptions.6 3
As Jonathan Faull points out, EEC competition law and policy
have reached maturity. 6' It is time to decentralize enforcement. Continued exclusive Commission competence to grant
exemptions is no longer necessary and stands in the way of
decentralization.
The intellectual and practical difficulties arising from the
Article 85 bifurcation are seriously aggravated by the Commission's traditional Article 85(1) approach under which an overly
broad definition is given to restrictive agreements. Most arrangements between competitors of any size having the
faintest competitive interest are unenforceable unless notified
and blessed by the Commission.6 5 By placing most joint ven63. EEC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 85; Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(1),
13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62, at 89.
64. Jonathan Faull, The Enforcement of Competition Policy in the European Community:
A Mature System, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 219 (1991-1992).
65. The handful of exceptions have been created by the Court ofJustice, usually
over the objections of the Commission.
The Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, O.J. C 231/2 (1986), and the
1968 Notice on Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted Practices Concerning Cooperation Between Enterprises, J.O. C 75/3 (1968), corrected by J.O. C 84/14 (1968),
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tures of more than de minimis size under Article 85(1), the Commission effectively requires parties to obtain an exemption
under Article 85(3) or run the risk of nullity and fines. The
inadequacy of Commission resources to deal with the resulting
notifications has caused considerable delays and legal uncertainty. Indeed, the integrity and credibility of the EEC notification system is called into question. Conventional wisdom has
it that the great majority ofjoint ventures are not notified even
where a Commission blessing in the form of a comfort letter or
exemption decision could be expected.
Full function joint ventures provide the most glaring and
important examples of the failure of the notification or nullity
system.
B. Application of Article 85(1) to Joint Venture Formation
The Commission's decisions can be read by an optimist to
suggest a gradual evolution of Commission analysis under Article 85(1) toward a fuller and more vigorous analysis of the
joint venture's competitive effects in the joint venture's market
and in so-called spillover markets. The evolution is uneven
and comes in considerable fits and starts. Some decisions
clearly strike new paths or leaps forward, such as Mitchell Cotts/
Sofiltra,66 Elopak/Metal Box-Odin 7 and GEC-Siemens/Plessey.68
As expected, these decisions are hailed by happy observers as
heralding new eras. 69 But like biological evolution, throwbacks
occur; for example, a 1991 decision may contain bits and
pieces of the early "inherent restrictions" rationale.7 °
In many earlier decisions, the Commission applied Article
85(1) to the formation of joint ventures solely on the basis that
the parents were actual or potential competitors in the joint
venture's market. 7 ' An early statement of the Commission's
offer little to no comfort with respect to fuller-function joint ventures between firms
of significant size.
66. OJ. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111.
67. O.J. L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832 [hereinafter Odin].
68. O.J. C 239/2 (1990).
69. See James S. Venit, Oedipus Rex: Recent Developments in the Structural Approach to
Joint Ventures Under EEC Competition Law, WORLD COMPETITION, Mar. 1991, at 5.

70. See KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT, O.J. L 19/25, at 31, 17 (1991), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 1 CEC 2009, 2016-17. For further discussion, see infra section III.C.
71. Express restrictions on the parents and/or the joint venture have also trig-
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reasoning was given in GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators:
Even in the absence of express provisions, the creation of a
joint venture generally has a notable effect on the conduct
of parent parties .... Within the field of the joint venture
and in related fields such parties are likely to coordinate
their conduct and be influenced in what would otherwise
have been their independent decisions and activities.
Where the parent parties are actual or potential competitors, their participation in a joint venture is accordingly
likely to impair free competition between them, regardless
of the2 existence of explicit restrictive provisions to that ef7
fect.
Emphasis on actual and potential competition between the
parents is essential. The competitive relationship between the
parents is the most important single factor in the antitrust
analysis of joint ventures. The existence and extent of actual/
potential competitive overlap is highly relevant to assessing the
three competitive risks associated with joint ventures: (1) loss
of actual or potential competition in the joint venture's market
(widgets in France); (2) cartel (e.g., price fixing) or other anticompetitive behavior between the parents in non-joint venture markets (widgets in Germany or gidgets in France), and
(3) foreclosure of third parties.
Many Commission decisions are flawed by an anemic economic analysis. Particularly in earlier decisions, there was only
a bare finding that the parents were actual or potential competitors. Little appeared in the decisions to demonstrate the extent and importance of that competition (e.g., market shares or
other indicia of competitive importance). Invocation of largely
vacuous concepts like "inherent" restrictions masked the absence of rigorous analysis. 73 This situation has improved congered Article 85(1), such as covenants not to compete, exclusive supply/purchase
agreements between the joint venture and the parents, and restrictive licensing conditions. Express restrictions ordinarily should not be used to invalidate formation of
the joint venture. Much of the earlier confusion surrounding the role of express
restrictions has been dissipated through a more refined use of the ancillary restraints
doctrine. See infra section III.C.
72. O.J. L 327/26, at 31 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 10,000, at 10,136.
73. For example, elimination of actual competition between the parents has
been declared an "inherent" restriction sufficient in itself to trigger Article 85(1).
See, e.g., Rockwell/Iveco, O.J. L 224/19 (1983), [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 709, and
Olivetti/Canon, OJ. L 52/51 (1988), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
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siderably since the mid-1980s, mostly through an attempt to
make a "more realistic" appraisal of the potential competition
issue. In its Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission set forth a checklist of four sets of "objective" questions
relevant to such assessment, which related to the input and
production of the joint venture, sales by the joint venture, and
the risk factor. 4
Potential competition analysis is not limited, of course, to
examination of joint ventures under Article 85. The same
analysis applies under the Merger Regulation where the decisions evidence an increasing sophistication and willingness to
engage in a fuller analysis of the potential competition issues.
A more rigorous analysis of the competitive relationship
between the parents 75 is a necessary but not sufficient condition of a satisfactory application of Article 85. The absence of
actual or potential competition between the parents is certainly
an effective tool to filter out joint ventures from Article 85's
application. This is what the Commission has done in the
Mitchell Cotts general rule that joint ventures fall outside Article
85(1) where the parents are not actual or potential competitors.

6

An informed analysis should not stop, however, with the
finding that the parents are actual or potential competitors, no
matter how well based is that finding. This is as true for joint
ventures as it is for mergers. All relevant structural factors
must then be considered in determining whether there is an
"appreciable" restriction of competition resulting from formation of the joint venture. These include market shares of the
parties and other competitors, concentration data, and entry
conditions. These structural factors are relevant to all three
Rep. (CCH) 10,961, where collaboration in production was found to imply that the
parents would no longer compete in the manufacture and sale of the concerned
products.
74. See COMMISSION THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 50-52 (1984).

75. The competitive relationship between the parents on one side and the joint
venture on the other side is not relevant, because neither actual nor potential competition should be expected between them.
76. Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, OJ. L 41/31, at 35, 19 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R.
111, 119-20. There are two exceptions: (1) when the parents have substantial market power in adjacent markets and there is the risk of third party foreclosure, or (2)
when a network of joint ventures exists that threatens market integration or otherwise has anticompetitive effects.
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antitrust concerns noted above. The spillover concern requires that the structural factors be supplemented with other
facts relevant to assessing the risk that the parents will cartelize
or engage in other anticompetitive conduct in non-joint venture markets (e.g., prior history of price fixing, indicia of a collusion-prone industry, or existence of other links between the
parents).
Several Commission decisions and enforcement actions in
the last two years indicate some movement toward a less anemic Article 85(1) structural analysis. The most robust analysis,
accomplished under the rubric of "appreciable" effect on competition, unfortunately is found in a procedural context that
does not ensure the same "precedential" weight as a Commission decision. In GEC-Siemens/Plessey the Commission published a comfort letter clearing under both Article 85(1) and
85(3) the joint bid by two competitors for a third competitor,
with the subsequent division of the target's businesses.7 7
GEC-Siemens/Plessey does not draw a clear line between
Article 85(1) and 85(3). Reasoning and factors used to support the conclusion that Article 85(1) did not apply were also
used to explain why the agreement would be exemptable
under Article 85(3). Arguably, the Commission wanted to reserve the possibility to use both options, and it remains to be
seen whether the Commission's rather generous interpretation
of the term "appreciable" will be applied in other cases.
GEC and Siemens made a joint hostile bid for a wide
range of Plessey's business sectors, including telecommunications, traffic control systems, integrated circuits and defenserelated products. Parts of the agreement were exempted
under Article 85(3) and others were found to fall outside Article 85(1).
In the telecommunications sector, Plessey's and GEC's
joint venture was reorganized with GEC owning 60 percent
and Siemens owning 40 percent; joint agreement was required
for all major decisions. The Commission found the restriction
appreciable as far as public switching systems, large private
switching systems and transmission systems were concerned. 78
77. o.J. C 239/2 (1990).
78. Id. at 3, 19. The restrictions were nevertheless deemed exemptable under
Article 85(3), primarily because of very high R & D costs. The cooperation between
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As to small private switching systems, the restrictions on competition were not likely to be appreciable enough to fall under
Article 85(1) because of the growing number of competing
suppliers and the existing competition in the United Kingdom. 7 9
The Commission concluded that no appreciable restriction would result from Siemens's acquisition of Plessey's traffic
control business."0 Plessey had not been active in the German
market and Siemens did not sell appreciable quantities in the
United Kingdom. The two companies did not compete in any
other market within the EEC. s" The market was also characterized by the powerful position of purchasers which could impose systems specifications on the suppliers. But the Commission also declared that Article 85(3) was satisfied because of
benefits in production and distribution of goods and technological progress.8 2
GEC-Siemens/Plessey provides the most robust structural
analysis of ajoint venture under Article 85(1) to date. The following factors were considered: the relative market shares of
the parties; their general size and importance; the height of
barriers to entry; competition from other suppliers; actual and
potential competition from outside the EEC, particularly from
Japanese suppliers with the marketing capability to increase
Community sales; countervailing power of purchasers (national monopsonies); the large number of competitors at the
EEC level, even though there was only one in each Member
the two acquiring companies would enable the two companies to share their knowhow and spread R & D costs. This was the only way for the two companies to compete with other major market participants. The most powerful competitors were
NTT, AT&T and Northern Telecom.
The same rationale was applied to the integrated circuit business that was also
found to be exemptable under Article 85(3), although the Commission mentioned
that Article 85(1) might not apply because of the low market shares of the parties. Id.
at 5,
26-27.
79. Id. at 3,
19. As to surface acoustic wave devices, the Commission concluded that other major competitors would make it unlikely that the joint venture
could have an anticompetitive effect and infringe Article 85(1). Id. at 6, 35. This
result was supported by the fact that Plessey and Siemens acted to a certain extent in
different product areas.
80. Id. at 7, 38.
81. The market was highly concentrated at the level of national markets, but
fragmented at the Community level.
82. The Commission relied exactly on the same reasons as it used for its conclusion that the agreement fell outside Article 85(1).
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State; the need for international alliances or a stake in a local
competitor to penetrate another national market, and specialization by the parties.
Another recent decision which considers structural factors
is Odin.83 The decision is important primarily for its extension
of the Mitchell Cotts rule, i.e., that restrictions ancillary to ajoint
venture that fall outside Article 85(1) generally also fall outside
Article 85(3).84 Odin is also interesting for its structural analysis.
Elopak primarily supplies cartons for milk and other liquids. Metal Box makes a variety of packaging, including tins
and other metal packaging for semi-solid foods. They established a joint venture, Odin, to research, develop and exploit a
new type of container for UHT processed foods. The two parties agreed:
(1) to create a 50/50 jointly owned company, called
Odin;
(2) to grant exclusive licenses of their intellectual
property rights to Odin in the field of the agreement; however, for uses outside the field of the agreement or if Odin
decided not to exploit a technology, the parents could obtain non-exclusive licenses from Odin;
(3) that in other areas of packaging the parents were
free to carry out.R & D independently or with third parties,
and
(4) in case of a breakup, one of the parents would buy
all of Odin's shares. The purchaser would have to grant the
other party a non-exclusive, royalty-free license. The parties could not use the technology for any cooperation with a

competitor.8 5

The Commission applied the Mitchell Cotts rule that Article
85(1) does not apply to the formation of a joint venture where
the parents are not actual or potential competitors.86 The
Commission reasoned that the parents were not potential com83. O.J. L 209/15 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832.
84. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
85. Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 16-17 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 836-38. The
Commission decided first that the agreement could not benefit from the R & D block
exemption since Odin would not only produce but also distribute the goods. Id
86. Id. at 19, 28, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 841. The Commission further found no
foreclosure of third parties who could still start their own R & D in this area.
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petitors in the market for the new container that Odin was to
develop. Neither party could enter this market alone in the
short term, because entry would require the know-how of the
other party. The technical and financial risk involved in carrying out research would have precluded each party from carrying out research on its own.8 7
The Commission addressed the question of potential restrictions on future competition between Metal Box and
Odin's new container product. The Commission found no reason to suppose that Metal Box would use its influence in a
manner incompatible with Article 85(1) and concluded that the
entire agreement did not appreciably restrict competition.
The Commission accepted that if the joint venture were successful, the new product might compete with one of the parents' products. The Commission relied on the fact that the
agreement (notably the break up provisions) was sufficient to
avoid anticompetitive problems.8 8
Several decisions since GEC-Siemens/Plessey and Odin tem87. Id. at 19, 25, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 840-41. _Outside the joint venture's
market, the parents were neither actual nor potential competitors.
88. See Konsortium ECR 900, O.J. L 228/31 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
[1990] 2 CEC 2082. AEG Aktiengesellschaft, Alcatel NV, and Oy Nokia AB entered
into a cooperation agreement for the joint development, manufacture and distribution of a pan-European digital cellular mobile telephone system, "GSM." The agreement contained the following clauses: (1) a non-compete clause under which the
parties were prohibited from submitting other tenders for the GSM system in a country that was part of the Conference Europenne des Administrations des Postes et
des T6lcommunications (CEPT); (2) a clause stating that if several parties were involved in new developments, the resulting technical documentation should be exchanged permanently and cost-free; (3) post-expiry, all parties would have a nonexclusive right to the technical documentation, but sublicenses to third parties would
require the prior agreement of the other two parties, and royalties from these
licenses would be shared among all three; (4) a party excluded from the agreement
because of breach of "contractwould lose the right to the technical documentation;
(5) the agreement could be terminated by the end of 1993 on request by any party,
and (6) establishment of a joint distribution for the system. Id. at 32-33, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC at 2083-84.
The Commission decided that the agreement did not fall within Article 85(1),
mostly on the rationale that neither of the parents could have developed the joint
venture's product independently and the joint venture was the only way to carry out
the expensive research. Id. at 33, 2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC at
2085-86. The development of a GSM system involved high costs and the tender offers laid down tight deadlines. For these reasons, no single member of the joint
venture was able to develop the system independently and there was no potential
restriction of competition. In addition, on the demand side the only customers were
the fifteen national CEPT network operators.
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per optimism that the Commission is firmly committed to a
more rigorous structural analysis under Article 85(1).
In Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik,89 a subsidiary of
Alcatel France 90 and a subsidiary of Bosch 9' notified an agreement for joint research, development, exploitation and marketing of certain space electronic equipment for communications (civil radio communications, broadcasting satellites, and
data transmission to, from and between satellites). The Commission, after finding that the parties were actual competitors,
placed the joint venture within Article 85(1) on two bases.
First, competition between the parties was restricted because
(1) as a result of their cooperation, only one of the parties
would have undertaken R & D on specific projects whereas
previously both might have done so; (2) the choice of one of
the parties to market the products eliminated one supplier
from the market, and (3) parties were exchanging competitively sensitive information.9 2 Second, the joint venture restricted competition vis-d-vis third party suppliers.9 3
The Commission applied Article 85(1) even though it had
earlier noted the following market characteristics:
(1) the unique character of each project, which required highly adapted research and development and a very
high degree of cooperation between all the parties involved,
made R & D very expensive;
(2) the large number of competitors in the EEC and
worldwide,9 4 and certain non-European manufacturers
who, benefitting from their strong worldwide positions, had
R & D budgets far superior to those of their European competitors so that non-European competitors had won contracts for a number of recent EEC projects;
(3) the main customers for the products (national tele89. oJ. L 32/19 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 208.
90. Alcatel France is the world's second largest manufacturer of communication
equipment and systems. In the Alcatel Group, ATES is the largest manufacturer of
space electronic equipment carried on board satellites or space vehicles.
91. The subsidiary ANT is a leading firm in Germany in the field of telecommunications technology.
92. Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik, 0.J. L 32/19, at 23, 14 (1990),
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 208, 216-17.
93. Id.
94. Even in narrowly defined product and geographical markets, the parties'
combined market share was below 20 percent.

1991-1992]

JOINT VENTURES IN EEC

333

communications administrations, space agencies and organizations or direct broadcast satellite consortia) were not
numerous and as a result had considerable buying power;
and
(4) certain regulatory barriers prevented
the provi95
basis.
international
an
on
services
of
sions
The Commission's apparent failure to accord these factors
significant weight under Article 85(1) is consistent with its
traditional reluctance to engage in full structural analysis. Alcatel is an evolutionary throwback to the days when the Article
85(1) analysis ended with the bare finding that the parents
were actual or potential competitors.9 6
A second Commission decision in 1990, Cekacan,9 7 also reflects the earlier less rigorous approach. A Swedish group,
A&R, whose activities include packaging (essentially for foodstuffs), and ECA, a German manufacturer of paperboard and
paperboard packaging, formed Ceka Europe to develop and
market a new packaging technology (the "Cekacan" technology) only during its initial phase. The parents agreed not to
compete against Ceka Europe in its territory by manufacturing
or selling the products under contract and Cekacan machines;
following amendment of the original agreement, the parents
were permitted to manufacture and sell similar technologies.
Supply agreements with the parents were included.9 8 The
agreement had an initial three-year term, with indefinite extensions unless terminated by one of the parties subject to ten
months notice. 99
The Commission applied Article 85(1) and granted an exemption under Article 85(3).10 ° The Commission first found
95. Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik,

OJ.

L 32/19, at 22-23,

7-11

(1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 208, 212-15.
96. An individual exemption was granted essentially on the basis of the first condition of Article 85(3), i.e., contribution to improvement of technical and economic
progress. Id. at 24, 18, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 217-18.
97. O.J. L 299/64 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC 2099.
98. A&R has the right to supply Ceka with its total requirements of final products and machines. After 1995, Ceka will be allowed to purchase its machines from
another source. Raw materials are in principle supplied in Germany by ECA.
99. In case of termination, A&R has the right to purchase ECA's shares in Ceka
Europe. Following termination, the parties may decide to reinforce their old 1982
licensing agreement for the exploitation of the Cekacan technology.
100. Cekacan, O.J. L 299/64, at 70 (1990), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2
CEC 2099, 2107.
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that the parents were not actual competitors with respect to
Cekacan technology but were potential competitors in light of
their overall industrial activities."' The parents also directly
competed with respect to certain basic materials used in the
production of Cekacan packages. The Commission did not
base the application of Article 85(1) on the mere competitive

relationship of the parents. Specific restrictions were also
cited, notably the parents' agreements not to compete against
the joint venture 0 2 and the purchase and supply agreements. 03
The reference to the non-compete provisions is troublesome because it rests on the false notion that competition between parents and a joint venture can be expected and thus
can be "restricted" by the joint venture. The reference is also
not entirely consistent with either the Court of Justice judgments on non-competes (reasonable covenants not to compete
escape Article 85(1) entirely)"° or with the Merger Regulation's treatment of non-competes ancillary to a merger or con0 5
centrative joint venture.
In sum, Cekacan provides ambiguous signals as to whether
1990 ushered in a new era of flexibility under Article 85(1), as
101. Id. at 68, 30, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC at 2103.
102. The Commission reasoned that A&R and ECA would abstain from competing against Ceka Europe because they agreed to supply their customers only through
the firm; this prevented ECA from freely developing its own commercial policy within
its assigned territory (Germany) and therefore removed an independent operator
from the market. Id. at 68, 1 34-35, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1990] 2 CEC at
2104.
103. The Commission reasoned that the clauses requiring ECA to purchase exclusively from Ceka Europe the materials and services required for the production of
Cekacan packaging remove incentives from ECA to engage in the manufacture of
these materials (because it would not be able in any case to sell them for Cekacan
applications); this also put ECA at a disadvantage vis-d-vis third party competitors
that are free to market their products for Cekacan applications. Id. 37. Clauses
requiring purchase of certain minimum quantities were aimed at maintaining ECA's
volumes of sales in Germany constant and restricted its volume of sales outside Germany. Id. 38. The termination clauses were also cited as organizing the sharing of
customers because they have the effect of preventing A&R from independently selling the Cekacan machines in Germany and preventing ECA from leasing the machines outside Germany. Id. at 69, 41, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 2 CEC at
2105.
104. Remia BV and Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia v. Commission, Case 42/84,
[1985] E.C.R. 2566, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 1.
105. Merger Regulation, supra note 2, OJ. L 257/13 (1990).
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suggested by Odin and GEC-Siemens/Plessey.106
Another decision issued after Odin casts further doubt that
a new era under Article 85(1) has dawned. In KSB/Goulds/
Lowara/ITT °7 pump manufacturers formed a ten-year joint
venture for research, development and production of compo08
nents for pumps.'
The Commission applied Article 85(1) on the following
reasoning:
(1) the parties were competing pump manufacturers
and were potential competitors in the market for components because they were all in the financial situation to develop the products alone;
(2) the agreements restricted competition between the
parties because cooperation replaced independent actions
and competition;
(3) third parties were denied access to the technology
because of various secrecy provisions, the ban on sublicensing and appointment of one party as sole and exclusive
manufacturer for the parties, and
(4) some of0 9the parties in some countries had very high
market shares.'
106. See also Bayer/Hoechst, "Europe" No. 5359, at 13 (Oct. 27, 1990), where
the Commission issued an Article 85(3) comfort letter exempting an agreement concluded between Bayer and Hoechst for joint research, development and marketing of
a new drug for the treatment of AIDS. The exemption was justified on the basis of
the special circumstances of AIDS research requiring a long term overlapping of research and marketing and resulting advantages for medical progress.
107. O.J. L 19/25 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 1 CEC 2009.
108. One party is the leading European company and the largest worldwide; a
second party is the world's third largest manufacturer.
109. KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT, O.J. L 19/25, at 30-31,
16-17 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 1 CEC 2009, 2016-17. The Commission granted an
exemption, finding that:
(1) the introduction of the new pumps was a significant contribution to
the development of technical progress given the advantages of the new
products;
(2) customers would benefit from the new more efficient products,
which are energy saving and environment friendly;
(3) after analysis of the R & D costs and the financial risks implied in
the development of the products, the reality of which was established by the
fact that the new products were not as successful on the market as expected,
the indispensability of the cooperation was recognized, and
(4) no substantial elimination of competition could be detected yet because the products were not yet marketed, and in any case, they would have
had to compete with traditional pumps.
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C. Application of Article 85(1) to ParticularProvisions
The most important ruling in the Odin decision is the rule
that where the formation of a joint venture itself falls outside
Article 85(1), provisions that are no more than is necessary for
its efficient operation also fall outside Article 85(1).' 'O For example, the grant of an exclusive license by parents to a joint
venture does not fall within Article 85(1) if the parents are
neither actual nor potential competitors."I One important exception to the Odin rule concerns territorial restrictions that
the Commission is reluctant to clear under Article 85(1).
In Odin the following provisions fell outside Article 85(1)
as ancillary to the joint venture:
(1) the parents' granting Odin an exclusive, worldwide
license of relevant patent and know-how rights;
(2) for five years after the break-up of Odin, each parent was obliged not to allow a competitor of the other to
use that other parent's know-how or improvements made by
Odin;
(3) Odin was under an obligation to keep the parents'
know-how secret, and
(4) no party could sell its share in Odin to a third party
without the consent of the other party. The seller of Odin2
had a right of first refusal in the event of a further sale."
The grant of exclusive intellectual property rights was
seen as a guarantee that both parties would invest their full
efforts to the joint venture. The rights were necessary to enable Odin to develop both the new product and the machinery
and technology. They were also necessary to the manufacture
and marketing of the product.
In Mitchell Cotts several know-how license provisions were
found not to be appreciable restrictions within the meaning of
Id. at 33-36, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 1 CEC at 2020-24; see Screensport/
EBU Members, O.J. L 63/32 (1991), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) [1991] 1 CEC 2092.
*110. Odin, O.J. L 209/15, at 21-22, 36 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 844-45.
This is also emphasized in Commission Press Release, IP (90) 582 (July 23, 1990).
111. This fact distinguishes the Odin decision from the Mitchell Cotts decision.
Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, OJ. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111. In Mitchell Cotts,
one of the parent companies was a competitor of the joint venture; the grant of an
exclusive license was therefore a restriction to which Article 85(1) applied, although
it was exempted under Article 85(3).
112. Odin, OJ. L 209/15, at 20-22 (1990), [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832, 843-45.
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Article 85(1): the joint venture's obligation to keep the knowhow confidential, its obligation not to grant sub-licenses, and a
mutual obligation to disclose any improvements.'" 3 A noncompete obligation was also found to fall outside Article
85(1). I t 4 The exclusive license granted to the joint venture
also included a territorial restriction: the joint venture's production right was limited to the United Kingdom. In other
countries one of the parents was itself producing and selling
the same products. The Commission considered this restriction tot 15fall within Article 85(1) but exempted it under Article
85(3).
In a number of earlier decisions, restrictions on know-how
transfers were found to fall within Article 85(1) but were exempted under Article 85(3), Thus, Odin represents a significant relaxation of the Commission's position toward ancillary
6
restraints."1

Ancillary restrictions are also governed by rules under the
Merger Regulation. When restrictions are ancillary to mergers, simple or exclusive patent and know-how licenses are accepted as necessary for the completion of the transaction.
They may contain field of use restrictions. Normally, territorial limitations are not considered necessary. The same princlples apply to licenses of trademarks or business names.
In the case of concentrative joint ventures, the necessary
transfer of technology may be accomplished by means of
licenses. These licenses may be exclusive, without having to be
113. Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, 0.J. 41/31, at 35, $ 21 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R.
111, 120.
114. Id. at 35-36, 22, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 120.
115. Id. at 36, 26, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. at 122.
116. For example, in VW-MAN, 0.J. L 376/11 (1983), [1982-1985 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 7 10,551, the parties agreed not to license any
know-how or patents to third parties for a use in the field of the joint venture. This
restriction fell within Article 85(1), but was exempted as indispensable for the joint
venture to be competitive with other manufacturers. Id. at 13-14, 77 16, 31, [19821985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 10,551, at 11,281, 11,283.
In Carbon Gas Technologie, 0.J. L 376/17 (1983), [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 275, the
Commission exempted a provision requiring that the parties would neither use the
know-how nor transfer the know-how to a third party for a five-year period after the
termination of the joint venture. The restriction reinforced a more general restriction on competition between the parents and their joint venture. Exemption was
granted because the know-how provisions were necessary to achieve the objective of
the specialization agreement. Id. at 20, [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. at 281.
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limited in duration or territory. They are usually considered
necessary to the implementation of the concentration.
IV. EXEMPTIONS OF COOPERATIVE JOINT VENTURES
UNDER ARTICLE 85(3)
Generally speaking, the Commission has voiced support
for joint ventures and encouraged them, particularly in high
technology industries. In 1986 the Commission emphasized
its favorable position toward joint ventures that contribute to
market integration, risk sharing, innovation, technology transfers, development of new markets, improvements in competitiveness, strengthening small and medium-sized firms, and
elimination of structural overcapacity."' Joint marketing arrangements, at least where part of broader joint R & D and/or
production, are not as disfavored by the Commission as
before. 1 8 Thus joint marketing and distribution have been exempted in several recent cases. To a certain extent the Commission's favorable competition stance is influenced by
broader albeit ill-defined industrial policy considerations intended to encourage growth and innovation in high technology fields. " 9
Joint ventures vary considerably in their structures, purposes and effects. The Commission's Article 85(3) analysis
under the four conditions for an exemption are highly fact-specific. General rules can be derived only with caution. The
present section has the modest purpose of providing examples
(and hopefully an accurate flavor) of the Commission's Article
85(3) analysis of joint venture decisions.
In many earlier decisions, the Commission appeared to accept the benefits presented by the parties without considering
or weighing them against the competitive harms found under
Article 85()-a schizophrenic approach to Article 85. This
117. COMMISSION FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 41-42 (1986)
[hereinafter COMMISSION FIFEENTH REPORT]. The Commission compiles and summarizes data on joint ventures in the EEC in the annual reports on competition policy.
118. See Bayer/Hoechst, Commission Press Release, IP (90) 857 (Oct. 26, 1990).
119. See Manfred Caspari, Joint Ventures-The Intersection of Antitrust and Industrial
Policy in the EEC, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 449, 451 (Barry Hawk ed., 1986).

The priority sectors are information technology and telecommunications, factory
automation and biotechnology. See Programme of the Commission for 1985, E.C.
BULL. 36-37 (Supp. Apr. 1985).
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was partly explained by the fact that the Commission failed to
engage in an in-depth Article 85(1) analysis of the anticompetitive effects of the joint venture, being satisfied with "inherent"
restrictions. A number of decisions in the last decade evidence
a Commission attempt to bridge the gap between Articles
85(1) and 85(3), to weigh the competitive benefits and harms,
through the
and to moderate the schizophrenia, particularly
20
indispensability exemption condition.
Under the first condition-improvement in production or
distribution or promotion of technical or economic progressthe Commission has accepted the following benefits, among
others:
both parents into a
(1) facilitating entry by one or
2
new geographic or product market;' 1
(2) sharing financial and other risks in connection
22
with the development of advanced-technology products;'
products
(3) placing the manufacture of intermediate
23
used by the parents on a profitable footing;'
(4) simplification and acceleration of the transition of
technology from theplanning and 24research stage to that of
large scale industrial application;'
1 25
(5) reduction of overcapacity;
(6) utilization of a greater amount of existing capacity
through the emergence of a new and efficient competitor; '

26

(7) production of a wider1 2 7range of sophisticated
equipment at competitive prices;
(8) regaining competitiveness and progressively reducing losses through closure of plants, reduction in sur120. The decision in Rockwell/Iveco, O.J. L 224/19 (1983), [1983] 3 C.M.L.R.
709, provides one of the best examples of the Commission explicitly weighing competitive harms and benefits.
121. See, e.g., De Laval-Stork, O.J. L 215/11 (1977), [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9972.
122. See, e.g., Vacuum Interrupters Ltd., O.. L 383/1 (1980), [1981] 2 C.M.L.R.
217.
123. See COMMISSION SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 117-19 (1978).
124. See Carbon Gas Technologie, O.J. L 376/17 (1983), [1984] 2 C.M.L.R. 275.
125. See Bayer/BP Chemicals, O.J. L 150/35 (1988), [1985-1988 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,995.
126. See Rockwell/Iveco, O.j. L 224/19 (1983), [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 709.
127. See Alcatel Espace/ANT Nachrichtentechnik, O.J. L 32/19 (1990), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 208.
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plus capacity and optimization of transportation costs; 2 8
(9) ensuring a more constant and rapid transfer of
technology than would otherwise be possible, enabling introduction into the Community of high technology products that will
promote competition with non-Community
29
producers;'

(10) allowing major progress in rationalizing production activities, improving technical efficiency and product
quality in an industrial sector which is particularly
130
threatened by imports from outside the Community;
(11) sharing of know-how and costs in relation to development of improved products where such development
had been relatively unsuccessful when done separately by
the parties,' 3 and
(12) energy saving. 1

2

In its Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission
listed the following contributions to a number of general economic objectives:
(i) integration of the internal market, especially by
means of cross-border cooperation;
(ii) facilitation of risky investments;
(iii) promotion of innovation and transfer of technology;
(iv) development of new markets;
(v) improvement of the competitiveness of the Community industry;
(vi) strengthening of the competitive position of small
and medium sized firms, and
33
(vii) elimination of structural overcapacity.'
The second condition for exemption, that consumers receive
a fair share of the benefit, has not been subject to extensive
128. See Enichem/ICI, O.J. L 50/18 (1988), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,962.
129. See Optical Fibres, O.J. L 236/30 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder]
10,813.
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
130. See Bayer/BP Chemicals, O.J. L 150/35 (1988), [1985-1988 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,995.
131. See, e.g., COMMISSION EIGHTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 77-78 (1979)

(discussing Henkel/Colgate, J.O. L 14/14 (1972), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9491); see also Vacuum Interrupters Ltd., OJ. L 383/1
(1980), [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
132. See BP/Kellogg, O.J. L 369/6 (1985), [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 619.
133. COMMISSION FIFTEENTH REPORT, supra note 117, at 42.
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analysis by the Commission. Consumer benefits are usually
34
found in increases in sources of supply, reduction in costs,
better service, 35 or faster development and availability of new
products. 136 In general, when the other three conditions for
exemption under Article 85(3) are met, the Commission frequently considers that consumers will automatically share in
the joint venture's benefits, provided that the market is sufficiently competitive.
The third condition, the indispensability of the restrictions
imposed on the parties, has been analyzed from two angles,
the Commission distinguishing (1) whether the formation of
the joint venture is indispensable to achieve the asserted benefits, and (2) whether particular contractual restrictions are indispensable.
As to formation of the joint venture, the Commission has
on some occasions considered less restrictive alternatives such
as cross-licensing of technology or specialization agreements.' 37 It has also considered whether less restrictive joint
ventures could have been formed by each parent with smaller
competitors.13 8 However, the indispensability of the joint venture itself has rarely been challenged in decisions.' 3 9 Joint
ventures have been found indispensable on the grounds that:
(1) coordination of investment was necessary in order
to prevent costly and inefficient overcapacity in Member
States based on national rather than EEC requirements;

(2) the joint venture afforded the parties a better opportunity for achieving more "acceptable, timely and technical solutions than the free play of competition" between
them, and
(3) the joint venture was indispensable to the agree134. See Optical Fibres, O.J. L 236/30 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813; see also ENI/Montedison, O.J. L 5/13 (1987),
[1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 444.

135. See Rockwell/Iveco, OJ. L 224/19 (1983), [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 709.
136. See Vacuum Interrupters Ltd., OJ. L 383/1 (1980), [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
137. See ENI/Montedison, OJ. L 5/13 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 444; GECWeir Sodium Circulators, O.J. L 327/26 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)

10,000.

138. See Optical Fibres, O.J. L 236/30 (1986), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,813.
139. In Enichem/ICI, the Commission engaged in detailed analysis of the necessity for the joint venture. See Enichem/ICI, OJ. L 50/18 (1988), [1985-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,962.
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ment of U.S. partners to transfer advanced technology,
when simple licensing would not have provided for the necessary continual updating of technology.' 4 °
Specific restrictive provisions of the joint venture agreement are accepted as indispensable where they are reasonably
related or ancillary to the joint venture, as where they are necessary to promote the legitimate objectives or achieve the asserted benefits of the joint venture. This analysis is akin to the
ancillary restraints doctrine which is used both under the
Merger Regulation and under the Odin rule with respect to,
joint ventures falling outside Article 85(1).
Ancillary provisions have included non-compete clauses,
which have generally been found indispensable,' 4 ' exclusive
purchase and supply arrangements, which may be regarded as
indispensable depending upon the facts, 4 2 and licensing
agreements.
The fourth condition for exemption, when there is no possibility of elimination of substantial competition, has received
less attention in the Commission's decisions and is not further
examined here.
V. CONCLUSION
Joint ventures require a unified analysis in which both behavioral and structural elements are examined. This remains
true whether a "structural" merger statute or a "behavioral"
restrictive agreement/cartel statute is applied. The analysis
must focus on the three competitive risks:
(1) the loss of actual or potential competition between
the parents in the market in which the joint venture operates;
(2) cartel or anticompetitive conduct between the parents in non-joint venture markets in which the parents compete (the spillover effect), and
(3) foreclosure of third parties.
140. See John H. Riggs, Jr. & Anthony Giustini,Joint Ventures Under EEC Competition Law, 46 Bus. LAw. 849, 900-01 (1990).
141. See, e.g. Carbon Gas Technologie, OJ. L 376/17 (1983), [1984] 2 C.M.L.R.
275; Vacuum Interrupters Ltd., OJ. L 383/1 (1980), [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
142. The Commission approved of these restrictions in Rockwell/Iveco, O.J. L
224/19 (1983), [1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 709, and Vacuum Interrupters Ltd., OJ. L 383/1
(1980), [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 217.
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Excluded are asserted anticompetitive effects or restrictions on competition between the parents on the one hand and
the joint venture on the other, at least with respect to competition in the joint venture's market. Competition between the
parents and the joint venture should not be expected or postulated.
The unfortunate division of the antitrust analysis in Article
85 is peculiarly damaging to an intellectually coherent and predictable treatment of joint ventures. This is so because the
structural context (e.g., actual orpotential competitive overlap
of the parents, market shares, and entry conditions) is even
more important in assessing the competitive harms and benefits of a joint venture than is the case with most other horizontal and vertical agreements. It is these structural factors that
are most logically included under Article 85(1).
The only textual obstacle to a more rigorous and complete
structural analysis under Article 85(1) is Article 85(3)'s reference to a not insubstantial elimination of competition. The solution which best preserves the textual integrity of the statute,
and one which promotes better legal certainty and administration, is the following:
(1) Place the entire structural analysis under Article 85(1)
with respect to formation of the joint venture. Thus, market
shares, concentration data, and entry conditions would be used
to determine whether "appreciable" harmful effects could be
expected. Structural factors might also be used as filters or
screens; market power thresholds, for example, might be established.
(2) The mere finding that the joint venture parents are actual or potential competitors should not trigger Article 85(1).
More questions must be answered (e.g., relative market shares
and entry conditions).
(3) Structural analysis is essential with respect to the three
competitive risks: (a) loss of actual or potential competition in
the joint venture's market; (b) spillover (the collusive behavior
between the parents in markets outside those of the joint venture), and (c) foreclosure or exclusion of competitors and third
parties. With respect to the spillover risk, the structural factors
must be supplemented with other factors pertinent to the risk
of the parents' colluding in markets outside the joint venture's
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market (e.g., their prior history, or factors showing a collusion43
prone industry or market).'
(4) If formation of the joint venture falls outside Article
85(1), then the ancillary restraints analysis should apply to individual obligations and restrictions.
(5) If formation of the joint venture falls within Article
85(1), then individual provisions must be reviewed under both
Articles 85(1) and 85(3).
(6) The Article 85(3) analysis should not include structural factors, except that the last exemption condition could be
used as a dominant position filter to deny an exemption. Article 85(3) would continue to require proof of economic and
technical benefits and proof that formation of the joint venture
was necessary to obtain those benefits (with a corollary analysis
of any specific provisions).
A broadening of the inquiry under Article 85(1) has the
considerable if not decisive advantage of decentralization
through the expansion of national courts' power to examine
the antitrust validity ofjoint ventures. A block exemption covering all joint ventures would probably not provide a good
deal of legal certainty given the variety of ventures and the
fact-specificity of the analysis.
The Commission is preparing guidelines on joint ventures. 14 4 Guidelines are useful and will be welcomed by business and the bar. They cannot substitute, however, for a rigorous and complete structural analysis of each fact-specific joint
venture.
143. Query whether additional non-structural factors are needed to assess the
foreclosure risks. This would not appear to be the case under U.S. antitrust law. Cf
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Department of Justice
Guidelines, supra note 13, § 3.5, at 53.
144. In January 1992 the Commission circulated for comment draft guidelines
on cooperative joint ventures. The draft guidelines are reproduced in the Appendix
to this Article.

1991-1992]

JOINT VENTURES IN EEC
APPENDIX
DRAFT COMMISSION NOTICE

GUIDELINES FOR THE APPRAISAL OF COOPERATIVE
JOINT VENTURES IN THE LIGHT OF ARTICLE
85 OF THE EEC TREATY
CONTENTS
I. Purpose ...........................................
II. Joint Ventures....... .............................
A. Economic Context .........
..............
B. The JV's Effect on Competition ...............
1. Competition Between Parent Companies ..
2. Competition Between the Parent
Companies and the JV .....................
3. Effects on the Position of Third Parties ....
4. Factors in the Appraisal ...................
C. AppraisingJVs in the Light of Article 85(1)...
1. JVs Which Are Not Caught by the Ban on
Restrictive Agreements ....................
a. JVs Formed Within a Single Group of
Firm s ..................................
b. JVs Whose Activities Are Neutral in
Their Impact on Competition ..........
aa. JVs Which Perform Certain Internal
Organizational Tasks on Behalf of
Their Parent Companies ...........
bb. JVs Which Organize Cooperation
Between Their Parent Companies
in Fields Removed from the
M arkets ...........................
cc. JVs Which, in Fields Which Are
Close to the Market, Organize
Cooperation Between Firms Which
Do Not Compete with Each Other.
dd. JVs Which Organize Cooperation
Between Competitors in Fields
Which Are Close to the Market ...
c. JVs of Minor Economic Importance ....
d. JVs Which Do Not Affect Trade Within
the Community ........................

346
348
348
349
349
350
351
351
352
352
352
352

352

353

353

353
353
354

346 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 15:303

2. JVs Likely to Fall Under the Ban on
Restrictive Agreements ....................
a. JVs Between Non-Competing Firms ....
b. JVs Between Competing Firms ..........
aa. Pooling of Certain Specific
Functions ..........................
bb. Fully-Fledged JVs .................
c. Networks of JVs ........................
D. ExemptingJVs Under Article 85(3) ..........
1. Block Exemption ..........................
a. "Specialization" Regulation .............
b. "Joint Research and Development"
Regulation .............................
c."Patent Licensing" and "Know-How
Licensing" Regulations .................
2. Exemption by Way of an Individual
D ecision ...................................
3. Situations in Which Exemption Is Given
Sympathetic Consideration ................
E. Ancillary Restrictions .........................
1. Principles of Evaluation ...................
2. Assessment of Certain Additional
Restrictions ...............................
a. Restrictions on theJV ..................
b. Restrictions on the Parent Companies .
Other Forms of Association Between Firms ........
A. Assessment in the Light of Article 85(1) ......
B. Assessment in the Light of Article 85(3) ......

III.

354
355
355
355
356
356
358
358
358
359
359
360
361
362
362
363
363
364
364
364
365

I. PURPOSE
This Notice deals with the appraisal of cooperative JVs
(joint ventures) in the light of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty.
JVs, as defined in the Commission Notice regarding the concentrative and cooperative operations under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89,' are undertakings that are jointly controlled by other undertakings. "Control" is taken to mean the
possibility of exercising, directly or indirectly, a decisive influence on the activities of the JV. The effects on competition of
1.

OJ No L 257, 21.9.1990, p. 14.
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other forms of association which do not involve joint control
but which enable one or more firms to influence appreciably
the activities of one or more other firms may, however, be similar to those of JVs. Examples include the acquisition of a minority holding, unilateral, multilateral or reciprocal, whether
or not it entails representation on the various bodies of the
firms concerned. Such holdings must therefore also be dealt
with in this Notice.
Whether a JV or other form of association between firms
can be classed as cooperative depends on 'whether or not it
involves concentration as defined by Article 3(2) of Council
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the
control of concentrations between undertakings. Those operations should therefore be regarded as cooperative which have
as their object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of firms which remain independent. This category includes the establishment of a JV where it entails a risk of coordination of the competitive behaviour between the parents
themselves or between the parents and the JV. This is even
true where, by virtue of the agreement to establish the JV, or
its existence or operation, either party, without necessarily
communicating its intentions to the other, can reasonably be
expected to adapt its behaviour to that of the JV in order to
protect, and obtain a return on, its investment. Cooperative
operations continue to fall within the scope of Articles 85 and
86 of the EEC Treaty and must be considered in the light of
those provisions when proceedings are conducted under Regulation No 17,2 and Regulations (EEC) No. 1017/68, 3 No.
4056/864 and No 3975/87.' Concurrently with the introduction of the new legal regime arising from the Regulation on the
control of concentrations between undertakings the Commission intends to spell out as clearly as possible, in the interests
of the legal certainty of firms, the legal and economic considerations which inform its competition policy as applied to cooperative operations under Article 85 of the Treaty.
2.
3.
4.
5.

0J
OJ
OJ
OJ

No
No
No
No

13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62.
175, 23.7.1968, p. 10.
L 378, 31.12.1986, p. 4.
L 374, 31.12.1987, p. 1.
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This Notice is without prejudice to any interpretation to
be given by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities.
II. JOINT VENTURES
A. Economic Context
JVs may cover various fields of cooperation between firms:
their purpose may be R&D, the purchase of basic or intermediate products, investment, production or sales planning, the fixing of prices, the sharing of markets, or joint selling.
The number of new JVs in the Community is growing
steadily, mainly because enterprises:
-increasingly want to spread the risk of costly technological development;
-are tending to concentrate more on the fields of activity in which they have a great deal of experience, while
seeking, via JVs, to remain abreast of new and promising
developments in other fields;
-want to step outside what are often still the national
confines of their markets and gain a foothold in other regions of the Community.
JVs can give a spur to competition by promoting new technological developments, the creation of new products and the
penetration of new markets, thus speeding up economic integration. Yet they can also act as a barrier to competition, in
particular when they lead to market sharing or when they raise
the barriers to entry.
In terms of its purpose, a JV may be intended by its parents as a partial and temporary instrument of cooperation, in
which case it is often limited to an ancillary role such as:
purchasing raw materials; acquiring know-how; carrying out
certain types of research and development work and exploiting
the results; financing investment; manufacturing certain products or taking over certain work or internal-management tasks
such as accountancy, collection, tax or management consultancy, market research, advertising, the coordination of
sales or the provision of certain services.
In other situations the JV performs on a lasting basis all
the functions of an enterprise and in that capacity operates on
the market as an independent supplier or purchaser.
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B. The JV's Effect on Competition
The appraisal of a JV in the light of the rules on competition will focus on the relationship between the enterprises concerned and on the effects of their cooperation on third parties.
In this respect the first task is to check whether the establishment or operation of theJV is likely to restrict competition between the parents or between one or more parents and the JV.
This must be followed by an examination of whether the operation in question is likely to affect the competitive position of
third parties. Depending on the circumstances there may be
no restrictive effects at all on competition or such effects may
be evident in one or more of the relationships referred to
above.
1. Competition Between Parent Companies
Competition between parent companies can be restricted
only if those companies are already actual or potential competitors.
There is no restriction of competition if the JV operates
outside the actual or potential fields of activity of the parent
companies; its establishment therefore has only a positive effect, since it creates a new competitor. The same is true when
the JV brings together activities of the parent companies in a
field in which they cannot hold their own; this will make theJV
a permanent player on the market.
If there is genuine and open competition between the parent companies and if it is intended that the JV should operate
in markets identical, adjacent or related to those of its parents
it is very likely that cooperation between them will entail some
restriction of competition.
In order to assess in an individual case whether there is a
potential-competition relationship between the parent companies,5 a the approach followed must be as realistic as possible,
and provide answers to the following main questions (which,
while focused specifically on the production of goods, are also
applicable to the provision of services):
-Contribution to the JV
Does each parent company have sufficient financial re5a. See Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy (1983), point 55.
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sources to carry out the planned investment? Does each
parent company have sufficiently qualified managerial capacity and the necessary knowledge to run the JV? Does
each parent company have access to the necessary sources
of input products?
-Production of the JV
Is each parent company familiar with the technology being
applied? Does each parent company manufacture the products upstream or downstream and have access to the necessary production facilities?
-Sales by the JV
Is actual or potential demand such as to enable each parent
company to manufacture the product on its own? Does
each parent company have access to the distribution channels needed to sell the product manufactured by the JV?
-Risk Factor
Can each parent company on its own bear the technical and
financial risks associated with the production operations of
the JV?
-Barriers to Market Access
Is each parent company on its own capable of entering the
geographical market concerned? Is access to that market
impeded by artificial tariff or non-tariff barriers? Can each
parent company overcome those barriers without undue effort or cost?
The parents of aJV should not be regarded as potential
competitors unless, in the light of all relevant economic factors, they can reasonably be expected to enter the market
individually. The relative weight given to each criterion
when assessing potential competition may well vary from
case to case.
2. Competition Between the Parent Companies and the JV
Competition between the parent companies and the JV
can be restricted only if theJV operates on the same markets as
its parents, on markets upstream or downstream or on
neighbouring markets. In such cases the firms concerned
often divide up the geographical or product market, in particular by specializing their production, or by sharing out the customers. If, however, the parent companies and the JV remain
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active competitors they may well be tempted to soften competition by coordinating or aligning their behaviour as regards
pricing or the volume of production or sales.
3. Effects on the Position of Third Parties
The restrictive effect on third parties depends on the JV's
activities in relation to those of its parents and on the combined economic strength of the firms concerned.
Where the parent companies leave it to the JV to handle
their purchases or sales, the choice available to suppliers or
customers is restricted. The same is true when the parent
companies arrange for the JV to manufacture primary or intermediate products or to process products which they themselves have produced. The setting-up of a JV may even exclude from the market the parents' traditional suppliers and
customers; that risk increases in step with the degree of oligopolization of the market and the existence of exclusive or preferential agreements between the JV and its parents.
The existence of a JV may even be a barrier to market entry by potential competitors or impede the growth of the parents' competitors.
4. Factors in the Appraisal
The scale of a JV's effects on competition depends on a
number of factors, the most important of which are:
-the market shares of the parent companies and the
JV, the structure of the relevant market and the degree of
concentration in the sector concerned;
-the economic and financial strength of the parent
companies, and any technical or commercial edge which
they may have;
-the market proximity of the activities carried out by
the JV;
-whether the fields of activity of the parent companies
and the JV are identical or independent;
-the scale of the JV's activities in relation to those of
its parents;
-the extent to which the arrangements between the
firms concerned are restrictive;
.- the extent to which the operation keeps out third
parties.
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C. AppraisingJVs in the Light of Article 85(1)
The appraisal of a JV under the rules of competition does
not depend on its legal structure. What matters is the restrictive nature of the clauses agreed upon by the parties, and the
impact of the creation and operation of the JV on market conditions.
1. JVs Which Are Not Caught by the Ban on Restrictive
Agreements
Article 85(1) does not apply to the following categories of
JV, since they do not have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market and are not likely to have an appreciable effect on
trade between Member States.
a. JVs Formed Within a Single Group of Firms
Where a JV is formed by firms which all belong to the
same group and which are not in a position freely to decide
their market behaviour, the creation of thatJV is merely a matter of internal organization and allocation of tasks within the
group and is accordingly neutral in its impact on competition.
b. JVs Whose Activities Are Neutral in Their Impact on
Competition
The Commission Notice of 19686 lists forms of cooperation between firms which, by their nature, do not restrict competition. It also deals with cases in which cooperation takes
place via a JV. The definitions and delimitation criteria set out
in that Notice-and apparent from the case-law of the Court of
Justice and the administrative practice of the Commission-are
applicable to such JVs.
There are four types of JV [sic] in that category:
aa. JVs Which Perform Certain Internal Organizational
Tasks on Behalf of Their Parent Companies
This includes JVs which collect, analyse and process data
6. Notice concerning agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the field
of cooperation between enterprises (OJ No C 75 of 29July 1968, p. 3; Corrigendum,
OJ No C 93, 15.3.68 [sic], p. 14).
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on behalf of their parent companies, provide them with a tax
or business consultancy service or perform certain internal
functions on their behalf in the area of information gathering,
credit guarantees or debt collection. It also includes JVs looking after the technical or organizational aspects of the joint use
of existing production facilities and storage or transport equipment. In all such cases the effect on the business decisions of
the parent companies and, hence, on competition, is nil.
bb. JVs Which Organize Cooperation Between Their Parent
Companies in Fields Removed from the Markets
JVs which deal solely with research and development do
not, generally speaking, restrict competition, even where their
parents compete with each other.
cc. JVs Which, in Fields Which Are Close to the Market,
Organize Cooperation Between Firms Which Do
Not Compete with Each Other
JVs which are formed by non-competing firms and which
are designed to provide a joint selling after-sales or repair service are not caught by the ban on restrictive practices since
they do not restrict competition between their parentsand do
not affect the position of third parties.
The same is true of JVs set up as consortia for the execution of orders where the parents do not compete with each
other as regards the work to be done or where each of them by
itself is unable to execute the orders.
dd. JVs Which Organize Cooperation Between Competitors
in Fields Which Are Close to the Market
Exceptionally, the ban on restrictive practices does not
cover this type of JV provided that the parents' freedom to
compete with each other, and the position of third parties, are
unaffected. This group includes parents which pool their advertising effort or use a common quality label.
c. JVs of Minor Economic Importance
Agreements, decisions and concerted practices which
form the basis of a JV also fall outside the scope of Article 85 if
they do not have as their object or effect an appreciable restric-
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tion of competition. In its Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall under Article 85(1) of the Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community7 the Commission gives concrete meaning to the concept "appreciable"
by setting quantitative criteria and by explaining their application, thus enabling firms to judge for themselves whether their
agreements fall under Article 85(1). The prohibition does not
normally apply to such agreements if:
-the goods or services which are the subject of the
agreement, together with the participating firms' other
goods or services which are considered by users to be
equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use, do not, in the area of the common market covered by the agreement, represent more than 5% of the total
market for such goods or services and
-the aggregate annual turnover of the participating
firms does not exceed ECU 200 million.
d. JVs Which Do Not Affect Trade Within the Community
Article 85(1) does not apply to JVs which are not likely to
affect trade between Member States, e.g. when the JV's actual
or foreseeable effects on competition are strictly limited to the
territory of a Member State or to the territory of non-member
countries.
Nor does Article 85(1) apply in cases where the JV has
only an insignificant effect on trade or the structure of competition within the common market. Trade between Member
States is likely to be appreciably affected only when the thresholds referred to in the Notice on agreements of minor importance are exceeded.
2. JVs Likely to Fall Under the Ban on Restrictive
Agreements
In the case of JVs which are likely to be caught by Article
85(1) a distinction should be made between those formed by
competing firms and those formed by non-competing firms.
7. OJ No C 231, 12.9.1986, p. 2.
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a. JVs Between Non-Competing Firms
The appraisal ofJVs between firms which do not compete
with each other focuses as much on the nature of theJV's operations in relation to those of its parents (see II. B. 2) as on the
effects they have on the position of third parties (see II. B. 3).
Where theJV merely markets what its parents produce the
ban on restrictive agreements does not normally apply (see II:
C. 1(b)(cc)).
If the JV manufactures primary or intermediate products
for its parents or processes the goods produced by one or
more parent companies the application of Article 85(1) cannot
normally be ruled out, since there may be restrictions of competition both between the JV and its parents and vis-A-vis third
parties. There is even a great likelihood that, where the JV is
in a strong position on the markets concerned, the buying or
selling possibilities of third parties will be affected.
b. JVs Between Competing Firms
Depending on the functions performed by the JV on behalf of its parents there are two separate types of cases in which
competition both between the firms concerned and vis-a-vis
third parties is affected.
aa. Pooling of Certain Specific Functions
This type of case covers JVs which perform only certain
functions and are not present on the market in their own right.
These are JVs which are not covered by the Notice on cooperation between enterprises. Typically, they carry out certain activities on behalf of their parents in the field of research and
development, purchasing, sales or production:
-research and development JVs may, in exceptional
cases, restrict competition if they exclude individual research and development or if cooperation in the field of research and development has a direct impact on the conditions of competition on the market in the resulting product.
Competition tends to be restricted when cooperation extends to activities involving exploitation of the results of research and development;
-sales JVs exclude competition between the parent
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companies as suppliers, thereby limiting the choice offered
to buyers;
-production JVs have effects on competition which
differ according to whether they take over all or part of their
parents' production activities.
In the first case the parents continue to compete on the
marketing side only. The room for competition is appreciably
reduced, however, in that their manufacturing costs are the
same; this is even true where parents sell the JV's products
under different brands.
In the second case there are two separate types of situation [sic]:
-If the JV is handling the final stage of production,
processing what its parents produce, competition between
the parents is generally severely restricted, since their cooperation is close to the market and transfer prices tend to
become uniform;
-If the JV manufactures primary or intermediate products the likelihood of restraint of competition between the
parents increases with the importance of the primary or intermediate product in the manufacture of the final product.
The share of the primary or intermediate product in the
cost of the final product is crucial: if it is more than 50% of
total cost, competition between the parents will be heavily
reduced.
bb. Fully-Fledged JVs
This category covers JVs which perform all the functions
of a firm and are thus present on the market as suppliers or
buyers. In order to determine to what extent their activities
restrict competition a distinction must be made between the
following subgroups:
-If the JV operates on the same market as its parents,
it is very likely, not to say inevitable, that competition between the firms concerned will be restricted;
-If the JV operates on a market upstream or downstream of that of the parents with which it has supply or
delivery links the effect on competition between the parents
will be the same as in the case of JVs which perform only
some of the functions of a firm (see (aa) above);
-If the JV operates on a market adjacent to that of its
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parents, competition is restricted only if the two markets are
interdependent. This is the case where a JV manufactures
products which are complementary to those of its parents;
-If the JV operates on a market which is completely
removed from that of its parents the JV will rarely entail any
restraint of competition. Such a situation might arise where
the JV's turnover becomes so important to the parent companies' profitability that their propensity to compete actively with each other is diminished.
Combinations of these types of JV are often found in everyday economic life. An overall assessment will then need to
be made of the resulting restrictions of competition between
the firms concerned, and of the effects which their cooperation
has on third parties. Only those restrictions of competition
which can be foreseen when the JV is formed and which can
reasonably be expected to materialize must be taken into consideration.
c. Networks of JVs
Special attention must be paid to networks of JVs in their
various shapes.
-The First is where competing parent companies establish several JVs which operate on the same product market but in separate areas. On top of the restrictions of competition which can already be attributed to each JV, there
will then be those which arise in the relations between JVs.
At the same time, competition will be further reduced between the parent companies.
-The restrictive effects on competition are also likely
to be aggravated when competing parent companies set up
several JVs in respect of complementary products which
they themselves intend to process, or even in respect of different products which they themselves market.
-The most severe effect on competition occurs when
partners competing in the same oligopolistic sector set up a
multitude ofJVs for related products or numerous intermediate products.
-Even where the JV is formed by non-competing firms
and does not, on its own, entail any restraint of competition, it can fall under Article 85(1) if it belongs to a network
of JVs set up, with different partners, by the same firm and
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for the same product market.8 If the said partners compete
with each other there will, additionally, be restrictive effects
in the relationships between them.
D. Exempting JVs Under Article 85(3)
1. Block Exemption
JVs falling within the scope of Article 85(1) are exempted
from the ban on restrictive agreements if they satisfy the tests
laid down in a block exemption regulation. Cooperation via
JVs is, under the terms of two Commission Regulations, allowed in the field of research and development and production, but not in that of sales. A further two Regulations authorize certain agreements that restrict competition when technology is transferred to a JV by its parents, provided that the
latter are not competitors.
a. "Specialization" Regulation
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 417/85 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialization agreements 9 authorizes joint manufacturing, subject to a
twofold condition: the aggregate market share of the participating firms must not represent more than 20% and their aggregate annual turnover must not exceed ECU 500 million.
Where the turnover exceeds the limits specified, the participating firms may make use of an accelerated procedure in
order to have the exemption under the Regulation applied to
them. The exemption also covers the joint manufacture of
products which were not previously made by any of the participating firms. If theJV is also handling sales it can be exempted
only by way of an individual decision.
The Regulation accordingly applies only to JVs which are
not fully-fledged firms. It does, however, cover the entire
range of JVs which perform specific manufacturing functions.
This includes the joint manufacture of primary, intermediate
or finished products, provided that such products are supplied
exclusively to the parent companies and that those companies
8. Optical fibres.
9. OJ No L 53, 22.2.1985, p. 1.
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are not themselves manufacturers in the same field of activity
as the JV.
b. "Joint Research and Development" Regulation
Regulation (EEC) No 418/85 on the application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development
agreements' ° authorizes the establishment ofJVs whose activities may range from research and development to the joint exploitation of the results (production and the granting of
licences). The Regulation puts a ceiling of 20% on the market
share but places no limit on turnover. Joint selling via a JV
can, however, be exempted only by way of an individual decision.
The research and development Regulation likewise applies only to JVs which are not fully-fledged firms. It does,
however, allow all forms of cooperation in the field of production, since specialization is not made a requirement; the parent
companies may therefore start or continue production in the
same field as the JV. The JV's production may, however, be
marketed only by its parents. On the other hand theJV may be
charged with granting licences to third parties. This increased
scope for cooperation is also available to large competing
firms.
It is, however, limited to the exploitation of the results of
joint research and development, the exemption applying on
condition that such results substantially contribute to technical
or economic progress and are decisive for the manufacture of
new or improved products.
c. "Patent Licensing" and "Know-How Licensing"
Regulations
Regulation (EEC) No 2349/84 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of patent licensing
agreements" also covers agreements between the parent companies of a JV or between a parent company and the JV, provided that those agreements relate to the activities of the JV
and that the parent companies are not competitors. The Regu10. OJ No L 53, 22.2.1985, p. 5.
11. OJ No L 219, 16.8.1984, p. 16.
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lation applies to pure patent licensing agreements and to combined patent licensing and know-how agreements.
The Regulation authorizes the granting to a JV of exclusive territorial licenses covering manufacture and sales; protection through a ban on exports from the respective territories of
the JV and the parent companies throughout the period of validity -ofthe contract; and protection of a JV's territory against
active competition (manufacturing and advertising) from other
licensees throughout the period of validity of the contract and,
for five years from the date on which the product is first put on
the market in the Community, also against passive competition
(imports) from other licensees.
Regulation (EEC) No 556/89 on the application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of know-how licensing
agreements 2 contains similar provisions, except that the territorial protection between the JV and its parents is limited to
ten years from the signature of the first licensing agreement
concluded in the Community; the signature of that agreement
also marks the beginning of the period in which the JV may be
protected against active competition (ten years) and passive
competition (five years) from other licensees.
2. Exemption by Way of an Individual Decision
An individual exemption may be granted following notification where a JV restricts competition but satisfies the four
tests set out in Article 85(3).
The Commission must first check whether the JV entails
objective advantages which offset the risks which its establishment and operation pose to competition.
A JV is deemed to entail objective advantages when, by
improving production or distribution, in particular through
the introduction of new or more advanced products and
processes or through the opening-up of new markets, it helps
to improve the competitiveness of the firms concerned and
thus fosters dynamic competition on a market with a competitive structure. JVs which lead to major new investment usually
have positive effects.
On the other hand, JVs have essentially negative effects on
12. OJ No L 61, 4.3.1989, p. 1.
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competition when they provide their parents with either the
means to coordinate or align their competitive behaviour, be it
in the present (in particular by fixing prices, agreeing on the
quantities to be produced or sold, or sharing cut markets) or in
the future (in particular by joint planning of investment), or a
reason for doing so.
Such JVs constitute, or operate as, a traditional cartel.
In any case the overall appraisal of the JV is bound to be
negative if its establishment leads to the elimination of competition in respect of a substantial part of the products concerned. No exemption can therefore be granted in cases
where, by grouping together the activities of the parent companies, the JVs serve to establish, underpin or accentuate a
dominant position.
That is why major cases (in terms of the economic and financial power and market share of the firms concerned) will
always require a detailed individual scrutiny which enables
their objective advantages to be weighed up against the resulting adverse effects on competition.
3. Situations in Which Exemption Is Given Sympathetic
Consideration
Some JVs must normally be given sympathetic consideration from the point of view of competition.
This applies to JVs which create substantial new capacity
or which significantly increase their parents' existing capacity
(whether this involves the extension of a product range, of production or of a market). They are normally granted exemption
under Article 85(3), within specified limits for the aggregate
market share of the firms concerned.
The said market share should not normally exceed 20%
where cooperation between the parents does not extend beyond production, and 10% when it includes marketing. It is
necessary to make such a distinction because the risk to competition increases as cooperation moves nearer the market.
Within those market-share limits it is fair to assume that
the effects in terms of the exclusion of third parties, and the
risks in terms of barriers to entry are kept within reasonable
proportions and that the market structure will continue to ensure effective competition.
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Networks of JVs cannot, however, be given sympathetic
consideration as such and must accordingly be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. Sympathetic consideration can under no
circumstances be given to JVs which help further to tighten an
already narrow oligopoly.
E. Ancillary Restrictions
1. Principles of Evaluation
A distinction must be made between restrictions of competition which are inherent in the actual creation of a JV, and
additional agreements which would, on their own, constitute
restrictions of competition by limiting the freedom of action in
the market of the firms concerned. Those additional agreements are either directly related and necessary to the establishment and operation of theJV in so far as they cannot be dissociated from it without jeopardizing its existence, or are simply
concluded at the same time without having those features.
Only additional agreements which are directly related and
necessary to theJV must be assessed together with theJV itself
and be treated, in the light of the rules of competition, as ancillary restrictions if they remain subordinate in importance to
the main object of the JV. In particular as concerns the necessity of the restriction, it is proper not only to take account of its
nature, but equally to ensure that its duration and subject-matter, and geographical field of application, do not exceed what
the creation and operation of the JV reasonably requires.
If a JV does not per se fall within the scope of Article 85(1),
then neither do any additional agreements which, while they
restrict competition, are ancillary to the JV in the manner described above.
Conversely, if a JV falls within the scope of Article 85(1),
then so will any ancillary restrictions. The same exemption criteria will then apply to both, and no specific justification need
be given as regards the ancillary restrictions.
On the other hand, additional agreements which are not
ancillary to the JV normally fall within the scope of Article
85(1), regardless of the fact that the JV itself may not. For
them to be granted exemption under Article 85(3), an individual assessment must first be made on their own merits, irrespective of the merits of the JV itself.
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In view of the diversity of JVs and of the restrictions that
may be linked to them, only a few examples can be given of
how those principles are applied, drawing on past experience.
2. Assessment of Certain Additional Restrictions
When attempting to determine whether additional restrictions are ancillary a distinction must be made between those
which affect the JV and those which affect the parent companies.
a. Restrictions on the JV
Of the restrictions which affect the JV, those which give
concrete expression to its object (e.g. contract clauses which
specify the product range and the location of production) may
be regarded as ancillary. Additional restrictions which go beyond the definition of the corporate object and which relate to
quantities, prices or customers, and prohibitions of exports,
may not.
Thus when a JV involves the creation of new production
capacity or the transfer of technology from the parent companies, the obligation imposed on the JV not to manufacture or
market products competing with the licensed products may be
regarded as ancillary; theJV must seek to ensure the success of
the new production unit, without depriving the parent companies of the necessary control
over exploitation and dissemina3
'
technology.
their
of
tion
Depending on circumstances, other restrictions on the JV
which should be seen as an inevitable consequence of the parents' wish to limit cooperation to a specific field of activity and
avoid compromising the object and existence of the JV,'

4

may

also be regarded as ancillary.
Where the parent companies assign to the JV certain
stages of production or the manufacture of certain products,
obligations on the JV to purchase from or supply its parents
may also be regarded as ancillary, at least during theJV's starting-up period.
13. Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra.
14. Elopak/Metal Box--Odin.
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b. Restrictions on the Parent Companies
A clause which bars the parent companies from competing
with the JV or from competing actively with it on its territory,
at least during the starting-up period, may be regarded as ancillary. Additional restrictions relating to quantities, prices or
customers, and bans on exports obviously go beyond what is
required for the setting-up and proper operation of the JV.
The following in particular have been regarded as necessary during the starting-up period of a JV designed to enable a
parent company to become established on a new market: territorial restrictions imposed on that parent company, through
the grant to the JV of an exclusive manufacturing licence, in
respect of fields of application or product markets in which
both theJV and that parent company are active.' 5
On the other hand the grant to the JV of an exclusive exploitation license has been regarded as necessary (without any
time-limit other than the duration of the JV itself) in cases
where the parent company granting it was not active in the
same field of application or on the same product market as that
6
for which the license was granted.'
This will generally be the case with JVs undertaking new
activities in respect of which the parent companies are neither
actual nor potential competitors.
III. OTHER FORMS OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FIRMS
Other forms of association between firms can produce effects on competition similar to those of JVs. This is true of
minority holdings, whether unilateral, multilateral or reciprocal, whether or not they involve representation on the decision-making bodies of the firms concerned.
A. Assessment in the Light of Article 85(1)
The acquisition by a firm of a non-controlling interest in a
competitor is not per se caught by Article 85(1). It may nevertheless serve as a means of influencing the behaviour of the
firms concerned in such a way as to restrict or distort competition on the market in which those firms operate. This is the
15. Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra.
16. Elopak/Metal Box-Odin.
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case in particular where the shareholding is used to underpin
cooperative links between the firms concerned or create a
17
structure which lends itself to such cooperation.
Similar but more substantial restrictive effects on competition occur when several firms which are already competing
among themselves take out a minority shareholding in a competing third party which, while it does not give them joint control over the third party, makes it possible for them to agree
jointly on or align the competitive behaviour of all the firms
concerned.
Cross-shareholdings between competitors, especially
when they are combined with representation on the decisionmaking bodies of the partners concerned, are likely to enable
the firms to inform and influence each other. They accordingly constitute a prime means of coordinating their market
behavior and thus of reducing if not eliminating competition
between them. In such cases the applicability of Article 85(1)
is not normally in doubt.
B. Assessment in the Light of Article 85(3)
The possibility of granting an exemption depends on all
the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the holdings
concerned.
If it merely replaces a traditional cartel or accentuates its
effects in such a way as to preserve existing market structures
the conditions for granting an exemption are not deemed to be
fulfilled.
If, however, the holdings are acquired as part of an effort
at cooperation the positive effects of which outweigh the risks
to competition, an exemption may be granted to them at the
same time and on the same terms as to the cooperation itself.
17. Judgment in Joined Cases 142 and 156/84 BAT and Reynolds v. Commission
[1987] ECR 4566 [sic].

